QuestionsMust we always obey the law?The bootmaker's authority: we accept an authority we choose, not one imposed on us
Must we always obey the law?No master

The bootmaker's authority: we accept an authority we choose, not one imposed on us

The bootmaker's authority

Mikhaïl Bakounine 1814 · 1876Russian revolutionary, theorist of anarchism: he rejects all imposed authority but accepts that which one freely chooses and can check.
See profile
What it claims

No fixed political authority, like that of the state, is legitimate: only the authority of competence, freely accepted, limited and revocable, is.

Why

We rely on the bootmaker because we choose him and can check him; a fixed, imposed authority such as the state has no such basis.

The same idea through history
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon1851Proudhon proposes replacing government with a free contract. Bakunin takes up the rejection of government, but adds that the authority of competence is acceptable if freely recognised.
Mikhaïl Bakounine1871God and the State: the version presented here. The text is a fragment of a longer manuscript; the title is that of its editors (Reclus and Cafiero, 1882), after Bakunin's death (1876).
In short

"The bootmaker's authority: we accept an authority we choose, not one imposed on us" is an argument by Mikhaïl Bakounine (Bakunin, God and the State (written 1871, published 1882), 1871) on the question "Must we always obey the law?" (answer: no master). Its claim: No fixed political authority, like that of the state, is legitimate: only the authority of competence, freely accepted, limited and revocable, is. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P4). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 3 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.

Bakunin, God and the State (written 1871, published 1882)
Valid with an implicit premise

Bakunin, who rejects God and the State, meets an obvious objection: so you reject all authority? He answers with an everyday example. For boots, I turn to the bootmaker; for a house, to the architect. But I let neither be imposed on me: I listen to them freely, I compare, I keep my right of criticism. What is legitimate is the authority one chooses, can check and which lasts only as long as the need. What is not legitimate is fixed, constant, universal authority, like that of a state. The text was published after the author's death, under a title chosen by his editors. The P1 to P4 → C form is our reconstruction.

P1An authority is acceptable when it is freely recognised, limited to one domain, and the person relying on it keeps the right to criticise and check it. For boots, one turns to the bootmaker, but does not let his authority be imposed.
P2In human life one receives and one gives: each directs and is directed in turn. There is therefore no fixed and constant authority, but a continual exchange of authority and subordination, mutual, temporary and above all voluntary.
P3The authority of a state is on the contrary fixed and constant. Even when elected by universal suffrage, assemblies form in a few years a body of politicians privileged in fact, who finally form a sort of political aristocracy or oligarchy.
P4 · implicit premiseThe same rule holds for political authority as for the bootmaker's: if it is not revocable and freely recognised, it is not legitimate.
Therefore no fixed political authority, like that of the state, is legitimate: only the authority of competence, freely accepted, limited and revocable, is.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.
Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Without the implicit premise: Without P4, the computer finds a case where the bootmaker criterion does not apply to the state: for instance because the state ensures a coordination (traffic, law) that no individual choice can replace. This is what Raz and Engels object.
The argument is valid. A legitimate authority is revocable (P1). But a fixed authority is not (P2). The authority of the state is fixed (P3). With P4, which extends the bootmaker criterion to the state, it is therefore not legitimate. The strength of the argument is that it does not reject all authority, which sets it apart from the slogan 'no gods, no masters'. Its weak points are P4 and P3: is a democratic state really fixed, since it can be changed?
Analogy. A mountain guide. You trust him because he knows the mountain, you follow him as long as you think him competent, and you can leave him. If he said: 'I am your guide for life, you have no right to ask why', you would stop following him.

Objections

3

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

F
Friedrich Engels 1872 · attacks premise 4

Engels attacks the 'anti-authoritarians': in large-scale industry, production depends on combined actions, hence on organisation, hence on authority. In a cotton mill the workers must agree on working hours, then all observe them, without exception. Wanting to abolish authority in large-scale industry is tantamount to wanting to abolish industry itself. He concludes that a society without authority is impossible.

Bakounine replies
We have not yet found a direct reply by Bakounine in the texts.
B
Bakunin 1871 · What Bakunin wrote in 1871, before Engels
Bakunin does not set aside the division of labour; he makes it the reason he bows before the authority of specialists. I receive and I give, he says: each directs and is directed in turn, so there is no fixed and constant authority, but a continual exchange of temporary and voluntary authority and subordination.
The debate goes on (our summary) Engels writes a year after Bakunin's manuscript, which was not yet published, and targets the 'anti-authoritarians' without naming him. The two positions are closer than they seem: Bakunin accepts the authority of competence, and Engels allows that questions may be settled by a delegate or, if possible, by majority vote. Their real disagreement is whether a permanent political authority (the state) follows from it, or whether it can remain revocable (our summary).
Where the debate stands (our summary)Engels: modern organisation demands authority. Bakunin: a temporary, voluntary authority of competence is enough. The basic disagreement remains: can the authority needed for organisation stay revocable, or does it inevitably become permanent?
J
Joseph Raz 1985 · attacks the conclusion

Raz defends the 'service conception' of authority: an authority is legitimate when, by following its directives, one conforms better to the reasons that apply to us than by acting on one's own. This conception resembles Bakunin's bootmaker. But it also applies to a state for questions of coordination (traffic, standards), where no one can replace a common rule. The state can therefore be legitimate in such cases, without being fixed in everything (our summary).

a defender replies
No reply possible: objection raised in 1985, after the author's death (1876).
R
Robert Paul Wolff defender of the argument · 1970 · What Wolff argued in 1970, before Raz
Wolff argues that moral autonomy (acting on one's own reason) is incompatible with obeying an authority, since to obey is to follow a command as such rather than for its reasons. He concludes that the state, which claims authority, cannot be legitimate for an autonomous person, and that philosophical anarchism is therefore the only coherent position.
The debate goes on (our summary) Raz, who discusses Wolff's thesis, answers that autonomy is not threatened when one follows an authority because it helps one do better what one has reason to do. Bakunin stands between the two: he accepts authority that helps, but refuses that it be imposed (our summary). The disagreement therefore concerns the possibility of a political authority that is not imposed.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Raz: the state can be a legitimate authority for coordination. Wolff: all authority is incompatible with autonomy. The basic disagreement remains: can a common rule imposed on all be freely accepted by each?
Plato 375 BC · attacks premise 3

In the Republic, Plato (through Socrates) claims that the evils of cities will not cease unless philosophers become kings or kings become true philosophers. Governing requires knowledge, like a craft: power must therefore be entrusted to those who know. It is the bootmaker's reasoning applied to the state.

Bakounine replies
B
Bakunin 1871 · Bakunin on the government of the learned
Bakunin foresees the objection: a scientific body to which the government of society had been entrusted would soon end by devoting itself no longer to science at all, but to another affair, which, as with all established powers, would be its own perpetuation by rendering society ever more stupid and thus more in need of its government.
The debate goes on (our summary) Plato knew this risk: the philosopher-king is trained not to love power. Bakunin thinks this training does not stand up against the logic of established power (our summary). The basic disagreement concerns what knowledge can do against the interest of those who hold it.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Plato: knowledge must govern. Bakunin: a body of scholars in power stops serving science. The basic disagreement remains: can knowledge protect itself from the corruption of power?