Push-pin is as good as poetry
Push-pin or poetry; pleasure as the only measure of the arts
Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with music and poetry; if it gives more pleasure, it is more valuable. If poetry deserves preference, it is because it gratifies those who are most difficult to please.
The value of an art is measured by the pleasure it gives; any other ranking among the arts is fanciful.
"Push-pin is as good as poetry" is an argument by Jeremy Bentham (Bentham, The Rationale of Reward, 1825, book III, ch. 1, 1789) on the question "Is beauty in the eye of the beholder?" (answer: it is all relative). Its claim: Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with music and poetry; if it gives more pleasure, it is more valuable. If poetry deserves preference, it is because it gratifies those who are most difficult to please. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P3). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 1 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
Push-pin is an English children's game of pushing pins. Bentham writes that, prejudice apart, it is of equal value with music and poetry. His idea comes from his principle of utility: whatever is useful is so because it gives pleasure, so the value of the arts is measured by the amount of pleasure they yield. Any ranking that adds another kind of superiority (the nobility of poetry, the depth of music) is for him fanciful. He even notes that everybody can play push-pin, while poetry is relished only by a few. If poetry deserves to be preferred, it is only because it gratifies those who are most difficult to please. Bentham is speaking here of the value of the arts, not of "beauty"; yet his thesis places him among those for whom there is no beauty in itself: only each person's pleasure counts.
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P3, the computer finds a case where two activities give the same pleasure and yet do not have the same value: for instance if one also judges the quality of the pleasure, or the quality of the work.
Objections
3Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
David Hume (the critic and taste) 1757 · attacks premise 2Hume writes that whoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance between Ogilby and Milton, or Bunyan and Addison (a mediocre author and a great one, each time), would be thought to defend an extravagance, as if he maintained that a molehill is as high as Teneriffe, or a pond as extensive as the ocean. So there are differences of value in matters of taste.
a defender replies
Hume writes that whoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance between Ogilby and Milton, or Bunyan and Addison (a mediocre author and a great one, each time), would be thought to defend an extravagance, as if he maintained that a molehill is as high as Teneriffe, or a pond as extensive as the ocean. So there are differences of value in matters of taste.
Immanuel Kant (the pleasant and the beautiful) 1790 · attacks premise 1Kant distinguishes the pleasant, where each can say "it pleases me", and the beautiful, where it would be laughable to say "beautiful for me": whoever calls a thing beautiful requires the same feeling from others. Beauty is therefore not measured by each person's mere pleasure.
no reply
Kant distinguishes the pleasant, where each can say "it pleases me", and the beautiful, where it would be laughable to say "beautiful for me": whoever calls a thing beautiful requires the same feeling from others. Beauty is therefore not measured by each person's mere pleasure.
John Stuart Mill (higher pleasures) 1861 · attacks premise 3Mill, raised on Bentham's ideas, corrects: it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied, better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. Pleasures differ not only in quantity but in quality, as judged by those who know both.
no reply
Mill, raised on Bentham's ideas, corrects: it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied, better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. Pleasures differ not only in quantity but in quality, as judged by those who know both.