Living without appeal
Neither suicide nor the leap answers the absurd. One must keep it alive, that is, live in revolt, without hope or renunciation.
The absurd is a confrontation between the mind and the world; suicide, like the leap toward God, ends it instead of keeping it.
"Living without appeal" is an argument by Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus, 1942) on the question "Does life have a meaning?" (answer: the absurd). Its claim: Neither suicide nor the leap answers the absurd. One must keep it alive, that is, live in revolt, without hope or renunciation. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P3). AskPhilosophy presents 4 objections, 1 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
Camus opens his essay with a question: if life has no meaning, should one leave it? He calls the absurd the face-off between the human mind, which asks for meaning, and a world that gives none. He examines two exits: suicide, and what he calls "philosophical suicide", the leap toward God or the eternal that he reads in Chestov and in Kierkegaard. His answer is not consolation: it is to hold this face-off, without hope and without renunciation. Kierkegaard died in 1855: it is Camus who answers him, not the other way round.
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P3, the computer finds a case where the absurd is a confrontation, suicide ends it, and the person does not seek to preserve it: nothing then rules out suicide.
Objections
4Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
JJohannes Climacus (Kierkegaard's pseudonym), Postscript 1846 · attacks premise 2Faith is not a rest that would remove the tension. For Climacus, it is the very contradiction between the infinite passion of inwardness and objective uncertainty: without risk, no faith, and if I could grasp God objectively, I would not believe. The leap therefore does not settle the divorce, it carries it to the end.
Camus replies
Faith is not a rest that would remove the tension. For Climacus, it is the very contradiction between the infinite passion of inwardness and objective uncertainty: without risk, no faith, and if I could grasp God objectively, I would not believe. The leap therefore does not settle the divorce, it carries it to the end.
Pascal, Pensées 1670 · attacks the conclusionOne cannot stay neutral before God: "you must wager, you are embarked". If reason does not decide, living without appeal is already a wager, and the possible gain (infinite happiness) far outweighs the stake (a finite life).
no reply
One cannot stay neutral before God: "you must wager, you are embarked". If reason does not decide, living without appeal is already a wager, and the possible gain (infinite happiness) far outweighs the stake (a finite life).
OObjection: describing is not prescribing attacks premise 3Even if the absurd is self-evident, a fact commands nothing. Why should it be "preserved" rather than ended, or forgotten in distraction? One more principle is needed, which nothing proves: "one must stay faithful to what one holds true".
no reply
Even if the absurd is self-evident, a fact commands nothing. Why should it be "preserved" rather than ended, or forgotten in distraction? One more principle is needed, which nothing proves: "one must stay faithful to what one holds true".
Master Changwu, in the Zhuangzi (ch. 2) attacks premise 3A character in the Zhuangzi asks: how do I know that love of life is not a delusion, and that he who dreads to die is not a child who has lost the way and cannot find his home? In the same speech he adds that fools think they are awake, and that a great awakening might show this life to be a great dream. If what seems evident to us (clinging to life, refusing death) may be a dream, why should the confrontation Camus holds to be true be preserved at all costs? One could also learn to let go of it, without suicide and without God.
no reply
A character in the Zhuangzi asks: how do I know that love of life is not a delusion, and that he who dreads to die is not a child who has lost the way and cannot find his home? In the same speech he adds that fools think they are awake, and that a great awakening might show this life to be a great dream. If what seems evident to us (clinging to life, refusing death) may be a dream, why should the confrontation Camus holds to be true be preserved at all costs? One could also learn to let go of it, without suicide and without God.