It is wrong to believe on insufficient evidence
The ethics of belief
It is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence, even if the belief turns out to be true.
No belief is truly private: a poorly grounded one makes us gullible and can harm others, which honest inquiry would have avoided.
"It is wrong to believe on insufficient evidence" is an argument by William K. Clifford ("The Ethics of Belief", 1877, 1877) on the question "Should we believe without proof?" (answer: no belief without evidence). Its claim: It is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence, even if the belief turns out to be true. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P5). AskPhilosophy presents 4 objections, 2 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
A shipowner has to send an old emigrant ship to sea. He has doubts, and they torment him. So he persuades himself that Providence will protect these families, that the builders are honest, that the ship has already come through safely. He believes it sincerely, and the ship goes down. Clifford asks: what should we say of this man? He is guilty, he answers, for he had no right to believe on such evidence. And if the ship had arrived safely? He would be just as guilty: he would merely have been lucky. For Clifford, a belief is not a private matter. Each of us, in believing, builds a little of the world in which others will live. Hence the famous rule: it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P5, the computer finds a case where a belief on insufficient evidence harms others, where an honest inquiry could have avoided it, and where it is nevertheless not a moral fault: a mere misfortune, like a spreading disease, with no one responsible.
Objections
4Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
William James 1896 · attacks the conclusionThe duty to "avoid error" and the duty to "find the truth" are two separate laws. Clifford puts the first far above the second. But this choice is itself only a passion, the fear of being duped. James finds the exhortation fantastic: it is like a general telling his soldiers that it is better never to go into battle than to risk a single wound.
no reply
The duty to "avoid error" and the duty to "find the truth" are two separate laws. Clifford puts the first far above the second. But this choice is itself only a passion, the fear of being duped. James finds the exhortation fantastic: it is like a general telling his soldiers that it is better never to go into battle than to risk a single wound.
Objection anticipated by Clifford attacks the conclusionAre we then to become universal sceptics, afraid to put one foot before the other until we have personally tested the firmness of the road? Nobody can check for himself a hundredth part of what he believes. And shall we steal and lie because we have no personal experience that proves it is wrong?
Clifford replies
Are we then to become universal sceptics, afraid to put one foot before the other until we have personally tested the firmness of the road? Nobody can check for himself a hundredth part of what he believes. And shall we steal and lie because we have no personal experience that proves it is wrong?
See the rest of the debate (1)
Objection anticipated by Clifford attacks premise 5"I am a busy man; I have no time for the long course of study which would be necessary to make me a competent judge of certain questions, or even to understand the nature of the arguments."
Clifford replies
"I am a busy man; I have no time for the long course of study which would be necessary to make me a competent judge of certain questions, or even to understand the nature of the arguments."
Alvin Plantinga 1983 · attacks the conclusionClifford's rule does not stand on its own feet. Plantinga argues that classical evidentialism (having the right to believe only what is proved from certain beliefs) is incoherent: its own rule is neither self-evident nor provable from such beliefs. If the rule were applied to itself, one would have to stop believing it.
no reply
Clifford's rule does not stand on its own feet. Plantinga argues that classical evidentialism (having the right to believe only what is proved from certain beliefs) is incoherent: its own rule is neither self-evident nor provable from such beliefs. If the rule were applied to itself, one would have to stop believing it.