The golden rule: do not do to others what you would not want done to you
We must not do to others what we would not want done to us.
Humans are close by nature: what is painful to me is painful to others too, so I can judge others by myself.
"The golden rule: do not do to others what you would not want done to you" is an argument by Confucius (Analects 15.23 and 12.2) on the question "What makes something right?" (answer: virtue). Its claim: We must not do to others what we would not want done to us. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P3). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 2 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
His disciple Zigong asks him whether there is one word that can guide a whole life. Confucius answers: "reciprocity" (shu), and explains it: do not do to others what you would not want done to you. Confucius does not prove this rule, he states it. The P1, P2, P3 → C form below is our reconstruction: it links three sayings reported in different books of the Analects.
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P3, the computer finds a case where I love others and people are close by nature, yet an act I would not want to suffer is not painful to the other: nothing then forbids doing it to them.
Objections
3Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
Kant 1785 · attacks the conclusionThis "trivial" rule cannot be the principle of morality. It grounds neither duties to oneself nor the duty to help others: many would accept that nobody helps them, provided they are excused from helping. And the criminal could invoke it against the judge who punishes him.
Confucius replies
This "trivial" rule cannot be the principle of morality. It grounds neither duties to oneself nor the duty to help others: many would accept that nobody helps them, provided they are excused from helping. And the criminal could invoke it against the judge who punishes him.
TThe objection from different tastes (George Bernard Shaw) 1903 · attacks premise 3Others do not necessarily share my tastes: what would bother me may not bother them, and what I would like may hurt them. Shaw said it with humour about the positive form of the rule; the extreme case is the masochist, who wants to be hurt.
no reply
Others do not necessarily share my tastes: what would bother me may not bother them, and what I would like may hurt them. Shaw said it with humour about the positive form of the rule; the extreme case is the masochist, who wants to be hurt.
Laozi (Daodejing) attacks the conclusionReciprocity does not go far enough. The sage of the Daodejing repays injury with kindness, without keeping accounts.
Confucius replies
Reciprocity does not go far enough. The sage of the Daodejing repays injury with kindness, without keeping accounts.