QuestionsAre we free?I do not believe in free will: what it changes is indulgence and good humour
Are we free?No free will

I do not believe in free will: what it changes is indulgence and good humour

Einstein and Schopenhauer: doing what we will without being able to will what we will

Albert Einstein 1879 · 1955The physicist of relativity: simultaneity depends on the observer, and there is no 'now' valid for the whole universe.
See profile
What it claims

Free will, in the strong sense, does not exist, and the right attitude is practical: indulgence toward others' acts, humility and humour toward oneself, while keeping responsibility as a rule of common life.

Why

If nobody chooses what they will, we can understand others' acts without losing our temper, and not take ourselves too seriously.

The same idea through history
Arthur Schopenhauer1839Schopenhauer shows that the will follows from character and motives. Einstein takes up his formula without redoing the demonstration.Pierre-Simon de Laplace1814Laplace draws from physics the idea that the present state determines the whole future. Einstein, a determinist physicist, belongs to this line.
Albert Einstein1929In an interview Einstein says he nevertheless acts 'as if' man were responsible, because one cannot live otherwise in society.
Albert Einstein1932He turns Schopenhauer's formula into a life companion: it reconciles him with others' acts and keeps him from taking himself too seriously.
In short

"I do not believe in free will: what it changes is indulgence and good humour" is an argument by Albert Einstein (Einstein, 'My Credo' (1932); interview with Viereck (1929), 1929) on the question "Are we free?" (answer: no free will). Its claim: Free will, in the strong sense, does not exist, and the right attitude is practical: indulgence toward others' acts, humility and humour toward oneself, while keeping responsibility as a rule of common life. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P3). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 2 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.

Einstein, 'My Credo' (1932); interview with Viereck (1929)
Valid with an implicit premise

Einstein is famous for relativity, less for his position on freedom. Yet he stated it several times, in Schopenhauer's words: man can do what he wills, but cannot will what he wills. This argument is not Schopenhauer's demonstration (see 'Doing what we will, but not willing what we will'). It concerns what Einstein draws from it: a way of living. If nobody is the ultimate author of their will, we can understand even painful acts without losing our temper, and stop taking ourselves and others too seriously. But Einstein does not go as far as abolishing responsibility: in social life, he says, one must act as if man were responsible. A caution: his statements come from a physicist, not a specialist on free will, and the 1929 one is an interview reported by a journalist.

P1A man can do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills.
P2The reason, for Einstein, is determinism: our acts and even our careers are fixed by factors over which we have no control, not by our own will.
P3 · implicit premiseIf nobody chooses what they will, nobody is the ultimate author of their acts: we can understand them as we understand an effect by its cause, rather than hate them.
P4This awareness of the lack of free will reconciles us with others' acts, even painful ones, and keeps us from taking ourselves and our fellow men too seriously as acting and deciding individuals, and from losing our temper.
P5A practical limit remains: to live in a civilized community one must act as if man were a responsible being; one may consider a criminal guiltless and still prefer not to take tea with him.
So free will, in the strong sense, does not exist, and the right attitude is practical: indulgence toward others' acts, humility and humour toward oneself, while keeping responsibility as a rule of common life.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.
Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Valid with one hidden premise, P3: not being the ultimate author of one's will makes acts understandable rather than hateful. That is the weak point: many philosophers think anger, resentment and gratitude are part of our moral life and do not vanish because one is a determinist. P5 shows that Einstein himself does not go all the way: he keeps responsibility as a useful rule without believing it true. The proof of determinism is not given here (see Schopenhauer's argument).
Analogy. When a stone falls on someone's foot, he does not hold it against the stone: he knows it could not have done otherwise. Einstein proposes extending this attitude a little to humans, without forgetting to step away from the stone the next time. That is what his sentence on the criminal says: one can judge him guiltless and still prefer not to take tea with him.

Objections

3

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

Peter F. Strawson 1962 · attacks premise 3

Resentment, gratitude and forgiveness are part of how we relate to other people, and they do not depend on a theory about determinism. Even if determinism were true, we could not, in practice, stop reacting this way: total indulgence, as a view of all humans, would be a life reduced to the 'objective attitude' we take toward a patient or a child.

Einstein replies
Einstein 1929 · What Einstein says in advance
Einstein himself recognizes this practical limit: to live in society he must act as if man were responsible. He therefore keeps, as a rule, protection against others ('I prefer not to take tea with him'), while refusing to believe the criminal guilty in the strong sense.
The debate goes on (our summary) A follower of Strawson would answer that 'acting as if' does not hold: those who treat responsibility as a mere convenient rule lose exactly what makes it work, the sincere conviction of attributing it to persons.
M
Max Planck 1936 · attacks premise 2

Planck, Einstein's friend and elder, holds that the law of causality applies to everything that happens, including our will, when seen from outside. But the person who wills can never completely know his own motives in advance: for him his will is free, and that is not a worthless illusion. Determinism and the feeling of freedom therefore do not contradict each other.

no reply
We have not yet found a direct reply by Einstein in the texts.
A
Arthur Eddington 1928 · attacks premise 2

Twentieth-century physics no longer lets us say that everything is determined: in quantum physics the laws fix only probabilities. The argument that physics rules out free will therefore loses its force.

Einstein replies
Einstein 1944 · Einstein's reply (to Born)
Einstein refuses to believe in a foundation of chance: 'You believe in a God who plays dice, and I in complete law and order in a world which objectively exists.'
The debate goes on (our summary) Even if quantum chance existed, a determinist would add that an act due to chance is no more my own work than an act due to a cause: chance does not make one free. Eddington's objection moves the question rather than settles it.