There is no 'now' for the whole universe: past, present and future form a block
The block universe; the relativity of simultaneity; an admittedly tenacious illusion
The distinction between past, present and future is only an illusion, however persistent: the world is a block of space-time in which all events exist.
Events simultaneous for one observer are not for another: no single "now" holds for the whole universe.
"There is no 'now' for the whole universe: past, present and future form a block" is an argument by Albert Einstein (Special relativity (1905); Minkowski, 'Raum und Zeit' (1908); letter of condolence to the Besso family (1955), 1905) on the question "Does time really exist?" (answer: passage is an illusion). Its claim: The distinction between past, present and future is only an illusion, however persistent: the world is a block of space-time in which all events exist. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P3, P5). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 2 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
The sentence is famous: 'For people like us who believe in physics, the separation between past, present and future has only the importance of an admittedly tenacious illusion.' A caution: it comes from a letter of condolence Einstein wrote to the family of his friend Michele Besso, on 21 March 1955, a few weeks before his own death. It is a private consolation, not a result of physics. The argument that supports it is something else: it is built by Minkowski, Putnam and others from special relativity. If two observers in motion disagree about what is simultaneous, no 'now' holds for the whole universe. Then past, present and future would all exist equally, like the points of one block. This reading is a philosophical interpretation of relativity, disputed by other philosophers and physicists.
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P3, the computer finds a case where simultaneity is relative and yet only some events are real: for example if what is real for an event is only its light-cone past. Without P5, it finds a case where all events exist and the passage of time remains a fact about the world.
Objections
3Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
Henri Bergson 1922 · attacks premise 2Bergson does not dispute Einstein's calculations but their reading. The times of different observers are measured times, conventions of physics. They all presuppose a lived, shared time, duration, which physics forgets. Saying there is no 'now' for the whole universe confuses the measurement of time with time itself.
a defender replies
Bergson does not dispute Einstein's calculations but their reading. The times of different observers are measured times, conventions of physics. They all presuppose a lived, shared time, duration, which physics forgets. Saying there is no 'now' for the whole universe confuses the measurement of time with time itself.
Arthur Prior 1959 · attacks the conclusionWhen we say 'Thank goodness that's over', what relieves us is not that the pain precedes this utterance, it is that it is over now. A world described without a 'now' does not say what we think when we want something to be behind us. Facts of past, present and future are therefore real, and the block leaves them out.
a defender replies
When we say 'Thank goodness that's over', what relieves us is not that the pain precedes this utterance, it is that it is over now. A world described without a 'now' does not say what we think when we want something to be behind us. Facts of past, present and future are therefore real, and the block leaves them out.
HHoward Stein 1968 · attacks premise 4Stein shows that Putnam's argument is not forced by relativity. One can define, for each event, what has already happened for it (its light-cone past), and keep a becoming without a universal 'now'. Events in my 'elsewhere' are not already real for me.
no reply
Stein shows that Putnam's argument is not forced by relativity. One can define, for each event, what has already happened for it (its light-cone past), and keep a becoming without a universal 'now'. Events in my 'elsewhere' are not already real for me.