QuestionsAre we free?A little free will, much grace
Are we free?Free will

A little free will, much grace

Erasmus 1466 · 1536In Praise of Folly: learning against fanaticism.
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What it claims

The human will has something free: a little free will, even if by far the greater part belongs to grace.

Why

If the will were not free at all, punishing would be mad or cruel, like whipping a chained slave; yet God is just.

In short

"A little free will, much grace" is an argument by Erasmus (On Free Will (1524), against Luther) on the question "Are we free?" (answer: free will). Its claim: The human will has something free: a little free will, even if by far the greater part belongs to grace. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P3). AskPhilosophy presents 5 objections, 1 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.

On Free Will (1524), against Luther
Valid with an implicit premise

In 1524 Erasmus entered the Reformation quarrel. Luther held that everything we do happens by necessity, and that God's grace alone can turn our will towards the good. Erasmus answers cautiously: he dislikes "assertions" and would readily side with the sceptics. But he judges that Scripture, taken as a whole, assumes that man can turn towards the good or away from it. His thesis is modest: the will has "something" free, but by far the greater part belongs to God's grace. This two-voiced debate is one of the most famous in history.

P1God gives commandments, warnings and threats, and punishes those who do not obey.
P2If the will is not free at all, commanding and punishing amounts to flogging a chained slave for what was not in his power: it would be mad or cruel. A sin that is not voluntary is no longer a sin.
P3 · implicit premiseGod is neither mad nor cruel: he is just.
Therefore the human will has something free: a little free will, even if by far the greater part belongs to grace.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.
Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Without the implicit premise: Without P3, the computer finds a case where God commands, the will is not free, and commanding would therefore be mad or cruel: nothing in the other premises rules this case out.
With P3 the conclusion follows: if the absence of freedom would make God mad or cruel, and he is not, then the will is not wholly without freedom. Without P3, nothing prevents us from accepting that God commands and punishes beings who are not free. Erasmus does not state P3 as a premise, because Luther grants it too: both believe God is just. The real disagreement is about P2: can a will that is not free still be guilty?
Analogy. A teacher sets a pupil an exercise, then punishes him for not doing it, though the pupil's hands were tied. No one would call that teacher fair. Erasmus says: if God gives us orders, it is because we can, at least a little, respond to them.

Objections

5

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

Luther (The Bondage of the Will) 1525 · attacks premise 2

Necessity does not mean compulsion. Man without God's Spirit does not do evil against his will, like a thief dragged to punishment: he does it of himself, willingly. So he is truly guilty. But he cannot, by his own strength, change that will. It is like a mount: if God rides it, it goes where God wills; if Satan, where Satan wills; and it does not choose its rider.

no reply
Érasme did reply, but that text is not yet in our corpus.
The debate goes on (our summary) Erasmus answers at length in the Hyperaspistes (1526-1527), which is not in our corpus. In On Free Will he already allowed an exception: sin remains imputable when error or the bondage of the will arise from an earlier sin. The debate goes on today: Luther defends a form of compatibilism (we are responsible for what we will, even if we cannot will otherwise), Erasmus a form of free will (one must be able to turn away from evil to be guilty of it).
Luther (The Bondage of the Will) 1525 · attacks premise 2

The commandments say what we ought to do, not what we can do. They are not given in vain: proud man, in trying to fulfil them, discovers his powerlessness. And Erasmus's argument proves too much: if an order makes sense only if one can carry it out, then free will can do everything without grace. That is Pelagius's thesis, which Erasmus himself rejects.

no reply
Érasme did reply, but that text is not yet in our corpus.
The debate goes on (our summary) Erasmus had partly foreseen this charge: for him, the law commands things we cannot accomplish without grace, and Scripture says that grace "helps" us; but one helps only someone who is already doing something. His free will is therefore not Pelagius's, but a small effort that cooperates with grace. The question remains whether this "small" effort is enough to make orders and punishments just. His direct answer is in the Hyperaspistes, not in our corpus.
Luther (The Bondage of the Will) 1525 · attacks premise 2

Yes, God seems cruel when he saves so few and damns so many. But that is precisely the summit of faith: to believe he is merciful, he who saves so few, and just, he who makes us necessarily damnable. If our reason could understand how he is just, faith would no longer be needed. So what seems cruel to our reason is no proof against God's justice.

no reply
Érasme did reply, but that text is not yet in our corpus.
The debate goes on (our summary) Luther does not deny P3: like Erasmus, he believes God is just. He challenges P2: our human idea of cruelty does not apply to God. Erasmus answers in the Hyperaspistes, not in our corpus. Many readers, believers or not, find that this answer empties the word "just" of meaning; others see it as the only humble attitude before God.
Luther (The Bondage of the Will) 1525 · attacks the conclusion

God foreknows everything, and what he foreknows he wills with an eternal and immutable will. So everything we do happens necessarily, even if it seems to us to happen by chance. This "thunderbolt" throws free will to the ground.

Érasme replies
Érasme Erasmus's answer in advance (On Free Will, 1524, before Luther's objection)
According to Erasmus, Lorenzo Valla untied this knot best. Knowing in advance is not making happen: we too foreknow many things that do not happen because we foreknow them. Astronomers predict an eclipse: it does not occur because they predicted it; they predicted it because it was going to occur.
The debate goes on (our summary) This answer covers only half of the objection: foreknowledge. Erasmus himself grants, just afterwards, that the question of God's will is "more difficult". Luther presses precisely this point: God cannot be mistaken, and his foreknowledge is one with his immutable will. If God foreknew that Judas would betray, Judas betrayed necessarily, even though he did it willingly. Whether infallible knowledge of the future leaves room for freedom is still debated (see also Boethius, and Nelson Pike in 1965).
Luther (The Bondage of the Will) 1525 · attacks the conclusion

A "moderate" conclusion is not enough. A Christian must assert what Scripture teaches, not weigh pros and cons like a sceptic: "The Holy Spirit is not a sceptic." Take away assertions and you take away Christianity.

no reply
Érasme did reply, but that text is not yet in our corpus.
The debate goes on (our summary) Erasmus had specified in advance that he doubted only where Scripture and the decisions of the Church allow it, that is, on obscure questions, and he ends his book with "I have compared; let others judge". His direct answer is in the Hyperaspistes, not in our corpus.