We are biological machines: free will is a convenient illusion
Biological machines (Hawking)
We are no more than biological machines, and free will is just an illusion. We nevertheless go on speaking of free will as an 'effective theory', because we cannot calculate what a brain does.
The brain follows physical laws like the planets: if our acts come from it, where could free will act?
"We are biological machines: free will is a convenient illusion" is an argument by Stephen Hawking (Hawking and Mlodinow, The Grand Design, 2010, ch. 2, 2010) on the question "Are we free?" (answer: no free will). Its claim: We are no more than biological machines, and free will is just an illusion. We nevertheless go on speaking of free will as an 'effective theory', because we cannot calculate what a brain does. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the conclusion does follow from its 3 premises. AskPhilosophy presents 2 objections, 0 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
In The Grand Design (2010), Hawking and Mlodinow raise the question of free will in connection with the laws of science. They start from biology: our cells, neurons and molecules follow physics and chemistry, as the planets follow their orbits. If our brain decides our acts, and the brain follows these laws, where could free will act? Their answer: nowhere. But they add that we cannot calculate what a brain does, so we speak of free will as a practical tool.
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Objections
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David Hume (the compatibilists) 1748 · attacks the conclusionHume writes that by liberty we can only mean a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will: if we choose to remain at rest we may; if we choose to move we may also. This liberty fits with necessary causes. Determinism therefore does not remove it, and the illusion Hawking describes is not one.
no reply
Hume writes that by liberty we can only mean a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will: if we choose to remain at rest we may; if we choose to move we may also. This liberty fits with necessary causes. Determinism therefore does not remove it, and the illusion Hawking describes is not one.
AAaron Schurger, Jacobo Sitt and Stanislas Dehaene 2012 · attacks premise 2The neuroscientists Schurger, Sitt and Dehaene study the brain activity that precedes a voluntary movement, the 'readiness potential'. It was seen as the preparation of the decision. They propose another reading: it would mainly be spontaneous fluctuations in neuronal activity, which produce the movement when they cross a threshold. The activity before the movement therefore does not show that the brain has already decided.
no reply
The neuroscientists Schurger, Sitt and Dehaene study the brain activity that precedes a voluntary movement, the 'readiness potential'. It was seen as the preparation of the decision. They propose another reading: it would mainly be spontaneous fluctuations in neuronal activity, which produce the movement when they cross a threshold. The activity before the movement therefore does not show that the brain has already decided.