QuestionsWho am I, really?I find only perceptions in myself, never a self
Who am I, really?No fixed self

I find only perceptions in myself, never a self

The bundle theory of the self

David Hume 1711 · 1776Neither causation nor induction can be proved: custom guides us.
See profile
What it claims

There is no simple and identical self over and above the perceptions: the mind is only a bundle of perceptions that succeed each other, and the identity we ascribe to it is a fiction of the imagination.

Why

When I look into myself I never find a constant self, only one perception after another (heat, cold, joy, pain).

The same idea through history
Nagasena100 BCIn the Milindapanha, the person is compared to a chariot: a name for an assemblage of elements, with no permanent self.
David Hume1739The mind is a bundle of perceptions; the identity we ascribe to it is a fiction of the imagination.
Derek Parfit1984Parfit defends a close "Reductionist" view: a person is nothing over and above the existence of a body and a brain and a series of interrelated events.
In short

"I find only perceptions in myself, never a self" is an argument by David Hume (A Treatise of Human Nature, 1.4.6 (1739), 1739) on the question "Who am I, really?" (answer: no fixed self). Its claim: There is no simple and identical self over and above the perceptions: the mind is only a bundle of perceptions that succeed each other, and the identity we ascribe to it is a fiction of the imagination. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P4, P6). AskPhilosophy presents 4 objections, 1 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.

A Treatise of Human Nature, 1.4.6 (1739)
Valid with an implicit premise

Who am I? The most natural answer seems to be: a simple thing, always the same, that feels, thinks and remembers. Hume proposes to check. He looks into himself as closely as he can and searches for this "self". What he finds are always particular perceptions: heat or cold, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. Never a self that owns them. He concludes that the mind is only a succession of perceptions, and that the identity we ascribe to it is not a discovery but a fiction made by the imagination. Note that in the 1740 Appendix Hume himself says he cannot explain how these perceptions hold together. This point is taken up in the debate.

P1Every real idea comes from an impression: we have no idea of what we never had an impression of.
P2If we had an impression of the self, that impression would stay the same, unchanged, throughout our whole life, since the self is supposed to exist in that way.
P3Yet no impression is constant and invariable. When I enter most intimately into myself, I always stumble on some particular perception (heat, cold, love, hatred, pain, pleasure) and never on a self without a perception.
P4 · implicit premiseIf a simple and identical self existed, we would have an idea of it: it would show itself to anyone who looks into himself.
P5Yet there is something that perceives, feels and thinks (I am not nothing): what one finds in it are perceptions.
P6 · implicit premiseIf the mind exists without a simple and identical self, it is nothing other than the set of its perceptions.
Therefore there is no simple and identical self over and above the perceptions: the mind is only a bundle of perceptions that succeed each other, and the identity we ascribe to it is a fiction of the imagination.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.
Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Without the implicit premise: Without P4, the computer finds a case where a simple self exists although we never have an impression or idea of it. Without P6, it finds a case where the mind exists without a self but is not reducible to its perceptions (there is something else, neither a self nor a perception).
With P4, the sequence P1, P2, P3 gives: no idea of the self, hence (by P4) no simple and identical self. With P5 and P6, what is left of the mind is the bundle of perceptions. P4 and P6 are not written as such by Hume; we add them to make the reasoning hold. P4 is the one opponents attack: they answer that the self is not an object one meets among the perceptions, but that which perceives them, so it cannot be "found" by searching. Hume justifies the fiction (the ascribed identity) in the same chapter, through relations of resemblance and causation between perceptions (T 1.4.6.15 to 19); our outline does not reproduce this second reasoning.
Analogy. Look for the "atmosphere" of a classroom: you will see pupils, voices, noises, glances. You will not find the atmosphere as one more object. Hume says the same of the self: searching closely, he finds only perceptions, just as someone looking for the atmosphere finds only pupils and noises. He adds an image: the mind is a kind of theatre where perceptions make their appearance, pass and re-pass, but there is no fixed place or stage where the play would be performed.

Objections

4

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

Descartes 1641 · attacks premise 3

When I doubt everything, I find one thing that resists: I think, and thought cannot be detached from me. So I am not a bundle of perceptions, but a thinking thing that I grasp directly.

Hume replies
see the argument
Hume (anticipated reply) 1739
Hume targets those who say they are, at every moment, intimately conscious of their self, its identity and simplicity. He answers that these claims are contrary to the very experience pleaded for them: when he looks into himself, he meets only particular perceptions, never the self without a perception. He offers no proof against them, only this finding,, and he admits that the other may be as right as he is and perceive something else in himself (T 1.4.6.3).
Where the debate stands (our summary)Both sides describe what they find when they look into themselves, and neither can prove his testimony to the other; Hume admits as much himself. The core disagreement: is the thinking Descartes grasps a subject distinct from thoughts, or just one more thought? An open point. (Our summary.)
Kant (the "I think") 1787 · attacks the conclusion

If perceptions were only a passing manifold, nothing would make them all mine. For representations to be mine, the "I think" must be able to accompany all of them and I must be able to connect them in one consciousness. Otherwise I would have "as many-coloured and various a self" as I have representations. The unity of the subject is therefore not a mere fiction: it is the condition for there to be experience at all.

no reply
see the argument
No reply possible: objection raised in 1787, after the author's death (1776).
The debate goes on (our summary) Hume died in 1776 and could not answer Kant. A defender of Hume would note that Kant speaks of a unity of consciousness, not of a simple and lasting thing, and that Hume is precisely seeking what makes the perceptions one (resemblance and causation, T 1.4.6.16 to 19). Kant, for his part, grants Hume that no permanent substance is grasped behind this "I think" (B 407-408). (Our summary.)
Where the debate stands (our summary)Kant and Hume agree on one point: no substantial self is found in experience. They differ on what follows: for Kant, the unity of the "I think" is the condition of all experience; for Hume, identity comes from a link between perceptions that the imagination adds. An open point. (Our summary.)
Hume himself (the Appendix) 1740 · attacks the conclusion

A year later, Hume rereads his chapter and admits failure. He firmly holds two principles: all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. But he cannot make them consistent with the idea that our perceptions form one mind: he finds no theory that satisfies him about what unites them. He does not conclude that his thesis is false; he says the difficulty is too hard for his understanding.

no reply
We have not yet found a direct reply by Hume in the texts.
The debate goes on (our summary) Hume never published a solution. In the same passage he leaves the door open: others, or himself on further reflection, might discover a hypothesis that reconciles these principles. (Our summary.)
Where the debate stands (our summary)An open point: Hume himself finds his account of the link between perceptions unsatisfactory, without giving up his critique of the simple self. There is no widely accepted answer in his texts. (Our summary.)
Thomas Reid 1785 · attacks premise 4

I am sure of my identity by an original conviction, which does not have to be drawn from an impression. A person is something indivisible, which thinks, deliberates, acts and suffers: I am not a thought, an action or a feeling. My thoughts pass, but the self to which they belong stays. A system that leaves only impressions and ideas does not even leave a self to own them.

no reply
No reply possible: objection raised in 1785, after the author's death (1776).
The debate goes on (our summary) Hume died in 1776, nine years before Reid's Essays were published, and did not answer. A defender of Hume would say that the "indivisible" thing Reid speaks of is exactly what he found in no experience (T 1.4.6.2), and that Reid's conviction is a fact about us rather than a proof that such a self exists. Reid would answer that this conviction is a starting point, like trust in memory or in the senses. (Our summary.)
Where the debate stands (our summary)The core disagreement: must we have an impression of a thing to believe it exists (Hume), or are there first convictions, like that of our own identity, that need no such proof (Reid)? An open point. (Our summary.)