The mind has only its perceptions: the external world cannot be proved
Hume's scepticism about the external world; the veil of perception
No reasoning proves the existence of external objects, and our belief in them comes from instinct, not from reason.
We cannot compare a perception with an object we never perceive: so no experience links our perceptions to the world.
"The mind has only its perceptions: the external world cannot be proved" is an argument by David Hume (Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, XII, part 1 (1748)) on the question "Is the world real?" (answer: no way to know). Its claim: No reasoning proves the existence of external objects, and our belief in them comes from instinct, not from reason. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P4). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 0 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
Everyone believes the table we see exists even when nobody looks at it. Hume notes that this belief comes from an instinct, before any reasoning. But the slightest reflection makes trouble for it: the table seems to shrink as we move away, yet the real table does not change; so what the mind has before it is only an image. Now, if we never have before the mind anything but perceptions, how can we know that they come from external objects that resemble them? Hume answers that no experience and no reasoning proves it. He does not say we should stop believing in the world; he says this belief rests on nature, not on reason.
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P4, the computer finds a case where neither experience nor a priori reasoning proves the external world, and yet it is proved in another way, for instance by a proof of a third kind.
Objections
3Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
Thomas Reid 1764 · attacks premise 1Reid finds Hume's reasoning just, given its principles. But he refuses the conclusion: so those principles, inherited from Locke and Descartes, must be questioned, in particular the idea that we perceive only our ideas. For him, we perceive things directly.
no reply
Reid finds Hume's reasoning just, given its principles. But he refuses the conclusion: so those principles, inherited from Locke and Descartes, must be questioned, in particular the idea that we perceive only our ideas. For him, we perceive things directly.
Bertrand Russell 1912 · attacks premise 3Russell grants Hume that the external world cannot be proved. But the hypothesis that life is only a dream, though not logically contradictory, is a less simple way of accounting for the facts than the common-sense hypothesis: objects independent of us whose action causes our sensations.
no reply
Russell grants Hume that the external world cannot be proved. But the hypothesis that life is only a dream, though not logically contradictory, is a less simple way of accounting for the facts than the common-sense hypothesis: objects independent of us whose action causes our sensations.
G. E. Moore 1939 · attacks the conclusionMoore maintains that he knows that here is a hand, and that it would be absurd to say he only believes it. This certainty is stronger than any sceptical premise: if Hume's argument proved he does not know, it is the argument that would have to be rejected.
no reply
Moore maintains that he knows that here is a hand, and that it would be absurd to say he only believes it. This certainty is stronger than any sceptical premise: if Hume's argument proved he does not know, it is the argument that would have to be rejected.