No right of resistance against the legislative power

Kant's refusal of a right of revolt

Immanuel Kant 1724 · 1804Set the limits of reason; act from duty.

What it claims

The people have no right to resist the legislative head of the state actively, even if he abuses his power.

Why

A right to resist the supreme law would need a law authorising it, so a supreme law that is no longer supreme: that is a contradiction.

The same idea through history

Thomas Hobbes1651Leviathan: the sovereign is not bound by the covenant, and the subjects cannot depose him. Kant reaches the same conclusion by another route: not fear of the war of all against all, but the logical contradiction of a right to resist the supreme power.

Immanuel Kant1797Doctrine of Right, General Remark A: the version presented here. Kant adds that reform is possible, but only from the sovereign himself, and that the people, through its representatives, may refuse some demands of the government ('negative' resistance).

In short

"No right of resistance against the legislative power" is an argument by Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Right, §49, General Remark A (1797), 1797) on the question "Must we always obey the law?" (answer: obey). Its claim: The people have no right to resist the legislative head of the state actively, even if he abuses his power. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P3). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 3 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.

Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Right, §49, General Remark A (1797)

Valid with an implicit premise

In 1797 Kant, who had welcomed the French Revolution from afar, nevertheless writes that the people have no right to rise against the head of the state, even before an abuse said to be unbearable. This is not praise of power: it is a thesis about what a right is. A right exists only within an order of public laws. A right of resistance to the supreme legislative power would therefore be a law that permits disobeying the supreme law, which is self-contradictory. Kant does not say the people must approve of a tyrant: he only denies them the right to attack him by force. The P1 to P3 → C form is our reconstruction.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.

Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Without the implicit premise: Without P3, the computer finds a case where the people have a right to resist although no public law provides for it (for instance a moral or natural right). The other two premises do not exclude it. This is exactly what Locke and Aquinas maintain.

The argument is valid. A right to resist would require a public law authorising it (P3). But such a law would make the legislation no longer supreme (P1), whereas a rightful condition requires it to remain so (P2). Its strength is that it rests neither on fear nor on tradition. Its weak point is P3: many deny that a right to resist must pass through a law.

Analogy. A football match: the rules let a player contest a foul with the referee. But a rule saying 'if the referee is wrong, the players may decide for themselves' would abolish the referee. Kant says the same of the state: a right to overthrow the supreme judge would abolish it.

Objections

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

John Locke 1689 · attacks premise 1

To the question 'who shall judge whether the prince or the legislative acts contrary to their trust?', Locke answers: the people. He who entrusts a power to a deputy keeps the power to discard him if he fails in his trust. There is nothing contradictory in this: the legislator's power is a trust, not a possession.

Kant replies

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Kant 1797 · What Kant writes in 1797

Kant asks the same question as Locke: who would be judge in this conflict between the people and the sovereign, two distinct moral persons in law? He notes that the people would then want to be judge in their own cause.

The debate goes on (our summary) Locke accepts the difficulty: in the same chapter he admits that there is no judge on earth and that only 'an appeal to heaven' remains (§242), that is, force, where each judges for himself. This is precisely what Kant wants to avoid, because it is a return to the state of nature. They judge differently which danger is greater: Locke fears abuse of power more, Kant fears more the absence of a common rule (our summary).

Where the debate stands (our summary)Locke answers that the people, who entrusted the power, are the only judge of a betrayal of that trust. Kant answers that the people would then be judge in their own cause. The basic disagreement remains: is it better to risk the abuse of an unchecked power or the disorder of a people that judges?

David Hume 1748 · attacks the conclusion

Hume too thinks the bond of allegiance should be drawn very close, but he admits resistance in extreme cases: since government binds us to obedience only on account of its tendency to public utility, that duty must yield in extraordinary cases where public ruin would evidently attend obedience. He notes that no one, reading of the insurrections against Nero or Philip II, is so blinded by party as not to wish them success.

Kant replies

Kant 1797 · Kant's passage on the unbearable abuse

Kant grounds the people's duty to bear even an abuse said to be unbearable on this: their resistance to the supreme legislator can never be thought otherwise than as contrary to law, even as destroying the whole legal constitution.

The debate goes on (our summary) Kant writes half a century later and does not cite Hume. But his text deals with the case: even before an 'unbearable' abuse, the people must bear it, because resistance would destroy the whole constitution. For Hume the question is one of degree (when is the necessity strong enough?); for Kant it is one of kind (a right to resist does not exist within the order of right). Kant adds one way out: reform by the sovereign himself (our summary).

Where the debate stands (our summary)Hume admits resistance when public ruin would follow obedience. Kant holds that resistance contradicts the very idea of a legal order. The basic disagreement remains: can law recognise a moment when it stops applying?

Thomas Aquinas 1270 · attacks the conclusion

Unjust laws, those that impose burdens for the ruler's own benefit, exceed his power or spread burdens unfairly, are acts of violence rather than laws. They do not bind in conscience, except to avoid scandal or disorder. And those that command against God's law must never be observed.

Kant replies

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Kant 1797 · What Kant allows: negative refusal

Kant admits, in a constitution where the people have representatives, a refusal without action: they may decline to grant everything the government demands. It is not an act of executive power but merely a negative resistance.

The debate goes on (our summary) Aquinas speaks of disobeying a law, Kant of resisting the legislator by force. The two positions do not contradict entirely: Kant does not ask anyone to commit a crime on command. He only denies a right to overthrow, punish or kill the sovereign, and leaves the door open to a 'negative' refusal expressed by the people's representatives (our summary).

Where the debate stands (our summary)Aquinas: an unjust law does not bind in conscience. Kant: no active resistance is allowed, but a negative refusal by representatives is. The basic disagreement remains: is personally disobeying an unjust law a right or only a matter of conscience?