The mind is born, ages and suffers with the body: it is material and mortal
Lucretius' proofs that the soul is mortal; "the mind is a part of man"
The mind is a material thing, a part of man, and it is mortal: it does not survive the dissolution of the body.
The mind grows, ages, falls ill, gets drunk and is cured along with the body, and moves limbs only by contact: so it is corporeal.
"The mind is born, ages and suffers with the body: it is material and mortal" is an argument by Lucrèce (On the Nature of Things, III, 94-135, 161-176, 445-529, 55 BC) on the question "Is the mind the brain?" (answer: the mind comes from matter). Its claim: The mind is a material thing, a part of man, and it is mortal: it does not survive the dissolution of the body. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P7). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 1 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
For many people thinking would be the work of a separate soul that lives in the body like a tenant. Lucretius, a Latin poet and a follower of Epicurus, answers with facts anyone can check. The mind, he says, is a part of man like the hand or the eye. It is born with the body, it is weak in a child and falters in an old man. Illness disturbs it, wine intoxicates it, a medicine cures it. And it moves the body, which only a bodily thing can do. What changes with the body in this way is material, and therefore mortal. He writes this around 55 BC to cure the fear of death (see the argument on death, lucrece-symetrie). The Latin text is in our corpus; the French is Nisard's translation (1868), free, and the English an old verse translation whose divisions differ.
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P7, one can accept all the facts and still say that the mind is of another nature: a pianist plays badly on an out-of-tune piano without his music being a part of the piano. The mind would depend on the body as a musician on his instrument, without being identical with it, and could outlive the instrument.
Objections
3Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
Plato 360 BC · attacks premise 7In the Phaedo, Socrates refuses that the soul be a mere harmony of the body, like the tuning of a lyre. If it were, it could only follow the states of the body. But it does the opposite: it resists the body's desires, for example it holds one back from drinking when the body is thirsty. What commands the body is therefore not reducible to what the body gives it.
Lucrèce replies
In the Phaedo, Socrates refuses that the soul be a mere harmony of the body, like the tuning of a lyre. If it were, it could only follow the states of the body. But it does the opposite: it resists the body's desires, for example it holds one back from drinking when the body is thirsty. What commands the body is therefore not reducible to what the body gives it.
Henri Bergson 1912 · attacks premise 7In "The Soul and the Body", Bergson grants that the life of consciousness is bound to the life of the body, that there is solidarity between them, nothing more. He compares consciousness to a coat hung on a nail: the coat falls if the nail is pulled out, it tears if the nail is sharp, without the nail being the coat. Showing that the mind depends on the brain does not prove that it is the brain.
no reply
In "The Soul and the Body", Bergson grants that the life of consciousness is bound to the life of the body, that there is solidarity between them, nothing more. He compares consciousness to a coat hung on a nail: the coat falls if the nail is pulled out, it tears if the nail is sharp, without the nail being the coat. Showing that the mind depends on the brain does not prove that it is the brain.
René Descartes 1641 · attacks the conclusionIn the Sixth Meditation, Descartes has a clear and distinct idea of himself as a thinking, unextended thing, and a distinct idea of body as an extended, unthinking thing. He concludes that his soul is entirely and truly distinct from his body, and can exist without it. He nevertheless grants that it is very closely conjoined with it, which accounts for the effects Lucretius lists.
no reply
In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes has a clear and distinct idea of himself as a thinking, unextended thing, and a distinct idea of body as an extended, unthinking thing. He concludes that his soul is entirely and truly distinct from his body, and can exist without it. He nevertheless grants that it is very closely conjoined with it, which accounts for the effects Lucretius lists.