Fortune and virtù: half our actions depend on us

Niccolò Machiavelli 1469 · 1527Power is judged by its effects, not good intentions.

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What it claims

Fortune decides only part of our actions, about half: she leaves us to govern the other half.

Why

Like dikes built before a flood, what we prepare limits the damage fortune can do.

In short

"Fortune and virtù: half our actions depend on us" is an argument by Niccolò Machiavelli (The Prince, 25) on the question "Are we free?" (answer: free will). Its claim: Fortune decides only part of our actions, about half: she leaves us to govern the other half. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P4). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 2 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.

The Prince, 25

Valid with an implicit premise

In his time, many think that God and fortune (chance, the unpredictable course of things) govern everything, and that struggle is useless. Machiavelli admits he was tempted to believe it. Yet he refuses to let our free will be extinguished, and defends a share for "virtù": the energy, foresight and talent of the one who acts.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.

Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Without the implicit premise: Without P4, the computer finds a case where the river image is right and dykes really limit the flood, yet nothing depends on us: it is enough that the decision to build dykes is itself produced by causes we do not choose.

With P4 the conclusion follows, and every premise is essential. P4 is not written: Machiavelli starts from free will ("so that our free will is not extinguished") more than he proves it. This is the premise determinists such as Spinoza attack. The figure "half" is an image, not a measurement: Machiavelli himself adds "or nearly".

Analogy. You do not choose the weather for an outdoor football match. But a team that has trained in the rain, has the right studs and a plan B, will drop fewer points on stormy days. The weather decides part of the result, preparation the rest.

Objections

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

Objection anticipated by Machiavelli attacks the conclusion

Many think that God and fortune govern the affairs of the world in such a way that human prudence can change nothing: better to let oneself be carried by fate.

Machiavel replies

Machiavel

Look at Italy: she suffered all these upheavals because she was an open country without dykes or defences. Had she been protected by adequate virtù, like Germany, Spain or France, the flood would not have done such damage, or would not have come at all.

Objection Machiavelli raises against himself attacks premise 4

No one is prudent enough to adapt to changing times, because we cannot depart from what nature inclines us to. If we could change our character with the times, fortune would not change. So our share is smaller than it seems.

Machiavel replies

Machiavel Machiavelli's reply (a period image, shocking today, quoted as it stands)

I judge it better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you want to keep her under it is necessary to beat and strike her. She lets herself be won by the bold rather than by those who proceed coldly.

The debate goes on (our summary) This only partly answers: if my character is fixed, becoming impetuous is not a choice for the cautious man. The chapter leaves open the tension between the freedom he defends and the nature that limits us.

Spinoza 1677 · attacks premise 4

People think themselves free because they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes that determine them. Applied to Machiavelli's image: building dykes is also an effect of causes, and our "share" is only the share of the causes we do not see.

no reply

No reply possible: objection raised in 1677, after the author's death (1527).