Free will as self-causation?
Free will in the strong sense does not exist. But determinism too is only a picture: there are only strong and weak wills.
Being free in the strong sense would mean being the cause of oneself, which is contradictory: one would have to exist before existing.
"Free will as self-causation?" is an argument by Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil, § 21) on the question "Are we free?" (answer: no free will). Its claim: Free will in the strong sense does not exist. But determinism too is only a picture: there are only strong and weak wills. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the conclusion does follow from its 2 premises. AskPhilosophy presents 2 objections, 0 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
Nietzsche attacks "free will" in the strong sense, which would make us solely responsible for everything we are.
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Objections
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Compatibilists (Hume and his heirs) attacks premise 1Freedom does not require self-causation: being free means being able to act according to one's will, without external constraint. That sense survives the argument.
no reply
Freedom does not require self-causation: being free means being able to act according to one's will, without external constraint. That sense survives the argument.
Kant attacks premise 2Freedom does not belong to the chain of natural causes: it is known through the moral law, which assumes we can act otherwise. The argument only holds within the order of nature.
no reply
Freedom does not belong to the chain of natural causes: it is known through the moral law, which assumes we can act otherwise. The argument only holds within the order of nature.