Justice is owed to every sentient animal: it must be able to flourish in its own way
The capabilities approach applied to animals; justice for animals
Justice is owed to sentient animals: the law must protect their flourishing and give them legal standing.
Every sentient animal strives to live well in its own way; injustice is thwarting that striving, and animals cannot defend themselves.
"Justice is owed to every sentient animal: it must be able to flourish in its own way" is an argument by Martha Nussbaum (Justice for Animals, 2023; Frontiers of Justice, 2006, 2006) on the question "Do animals matter as much as we do?" (answer: they have rights). Its claim: Justice is owed to sentient animals: the law must protect their flourishing and give them legal standing. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P5). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 3 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
For Martha Nussbaum, the question is not only to avoid making animals suffer. Each animal strives to live well in its own way: to move, to eat, to live in a group, to play, to act. There is injustice when this striving is wrongly thwarted. She draws the line at sentience, like the utilitarians, but refuses to look only at pain and rejects the idea of a ladder of nature with humans at the top. Since animals cannot defend their interests before a court, she asks that they have legal standing and representatives.
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P5, the computer finds a world where animals are wronged and humans choose to be kind as a private virtue, with no law. The other premises are true, but the conclusion about legal standing is false.
Objections
3Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
Peter Singer 1974 · attacks premise 2For Singer, sentience, the capacity to suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness, is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. It is enough to give equal consideration to the interests of all sentient beings; a long list of capabilities is not needed.
a defender replies
For Singer, sentience, the capacity to suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness, is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. It is enough to give equal consideration to the interests of all sentient beings; a long list of capabilities is not needed.
JJan Narveson 1977 · attacks premise 4For Narveson, a contractualist, rights are rules that beings able to understand them accept among themselves out of mutual interest. Animals cannot take part in this contract or claim rights themselves: this is his "rational egoism", set against Singer and Regan.
a defender replies
For Narveson, a contractualist, rights are rules that beings able to understand them accept among themselves out of mutual interest. Animals cannot take part in this contract or claim rights themselves: this is his "rational egoism", set against Singer and Regan.
JJeff McMahan 2010 · attacks the conclusionJeff McMahan, in "The Meat Eaters", argues that if animal suffering matters, the suffering caused by predators matters too. We would then have reasons to wish for the disappearance of carnivorous species, if it could be brought about without causing greater harm. He adds that with our present knowledge, it would be unwise to try.
a defender replies
Jeff McMahan, in "The Meat Eaters", argues that if animal suffering matters, the suffering caused by predators matters too. We would then have reasons to wish for the disappearance of carnivorous species, if it could be brought about without causing greater harm. He adds that with our present knowledge, it would be unwise to try.