Seen from far away, the Earth is a dot: no help will come from elsewhere, the responsibility is ours
The Pale Blue Dot (Sagan)
We have a responsibility to deal more kindly with one another, and to preserve and cherish the pale blue dot, the only home we have ever known.
Seen from afar, the Earth is a dot with no privileged place and no help comes from elsewhere: the responsibility is ours.
"Seen from far away, the Earth is a dot: no help will come from elsewhere, the responsibility is ours" is an argument by Carl Sagan (Pale Blue Dot, 1994, ch. 1 'You Are Here') on the question "Does life have a meaning?" (answer: a meaning to create). Its claim: We have a responsibility to deal more kindly with one another, and to preserve and cherish the pale blue dot, the only home we have ever known. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P4). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 0 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
In February 1990 the probe Voyager 1, already beyond the planets, is heading away from the Sun. At Carl Sagan's request it turns around and photographs the Earth from about six billion kilometres away: a tiny dot in a ray of light. Four years later Sagan writes a book around this image. He sees a lesson in humility: religions, wars, emperors, all of human history fit on this dot. Nothing suggests that we hold a special place, or that anyone will come to save us from ourselves. Sagan draws a responsibility from it: to treat one another better and to protect our only home.
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P4, the computer finds a case where the Earth is a dot, no help comes from elsewhere, and yet nobody has any particular responsibility.
Objections
3Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
Blaise Pascal 1670 · attacks premise 2Pascal knows the same dizziness: the eternal silence of infinite spaces terrifies him. But for him size does not decide worth. Man is only a reed, the weakest in nature, but a thinking reed: even if the universe crushed him, he would be nobler than what kills him, because he knows he dies. All our dignity consists in thought, not in the space we fill. The smallness of the Earth therefore does not take away our worth.
no reply
Pascal knows the same dizziness: the eternal silence of infinite spaces terrifies him. But for him size does not decide worth. Man is only a reed, the weakest in nature, but a thinking reed: even if the universe crushed him, he would be nobler than what kills him, because he knows he dies. All our dignity consists in thought, not in the space we fill. The smallness of the Earth therefore does not take away our worth.
Thomas Nagel 1971 · attacks premise 1Nagel argues that the size and shortness of our life cannot be what makes it absurd, or what strips it of meaning: even a huge or eternal being would face the same problem. The real problem is that we can always step back to a view from which our seriousness seems arbitrary. The view from afar, like the Earth seen from Voyager, therefore adds nothing decisive.
no reply
Nagel argues that the size and shortness of our life cannot be what makes it absurd, or what strips it of meaning: even a huge or eternal being would face the same problem. The real problem is that we can always step back to a view from which our seriousness seems arbitrary. The view from afar, like the Earth seen from Voyager, therefore adds nothing decisive.
David Hume 1740 · attacks premise 4Hume remarks that, in systems of morality, the author passes without warning from propositions about what is to propositions about what ought to be. This new relation needs to be explained: it seems inconceivable how an 'ought' could be deduced from an 'is'. That the Earth is a dot with no rescue does not yet say what we ought to do.
no reply
Hume remarks that, in systems of morality, the author passes without warning from propositions about what is to propositions about what ought to be. This new relation needs to be explained: it seems inconceivable how an 'ought' could be deduced from an 'is'. That the Earth is a dot with no rescue does not yet say what we ought to do.