QuestionsAre we free?The stone that would think itself free
Are we free?No free will

The stone that would think itself free

Benedictus de Spinoza 1632 · 1677God, that is, Nature: everything follows by necessity.
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What it claims

Free will does not exist, and our feeling of being free proves nothing: those who believe they act from a free decision of the mind "dream with their eyes open".

Why

Every act of will has a cause, and we feel free only because we do not know what causes our desires.

In short

"The stone that would think itself free" is an argument by Benedictus de Spinoza (Letter 58; Ethics I, appendix; II, prop. 48) on the question "Are we free?" (answer: no free will). Its claim: Free will does not exist, and our feeling of being free proves nothing: those who believe they act from a free decision of the mind "dream with their eyes open". According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P5). AskPhilosophy presents 4 objections, 3 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.

Letter 58; Ethics I, appendix; II, prop. 48
Valid with an implicit premise

We feel that we choose freely. Spinoza argues that this feeling is an illusion: it comes from knowing our desires but not their causes. For him, true freedom is not choosing without a cause, but acting from the necessity of one's own nature alone.

P1Every individual thing is determined by an external cause to exist and act in a definite way.
P2The human mind is no exception, not "a kingdom within a kingdom": each of our volitions is determined by a cause, itself determined by another, to infinity.
P3Free will would be a "free decision": a will determined by nothing.
P4People are conscious of their desires but ignorant of the causes that determine them: that alone is where their feeling of freedom comes from.
P5 · implicit premiseA feeling that is fully explained by ignorance of causes does not prove what it seems to show.
Therefore free will does not exist, and our feeling of being free proves nothing: those who believe they act from a free decision of the mind "dream with their eyes open".

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.
Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Without the implicit premise: Without P5, the computer finds a case where the feeling of freedom arises from ignorance of causes, yet still proves something: the full conclusion no longer follows.
With P5 the conclusion follows. The first three premises are already enough to deny free will; P4 and P5 disarm the best opposing argument, the testimony of consciousness. Without P5, one could say: our feeling may come from ignorance, yet it could still be true. That is where Descartes and Tschirnhaus attack.
Analogy. The image is Spinoza's own. A stone is thrown. Imagine that in flight it could think and feel its effort to keep moving: it would believe itself completely free, convinced it flies because it wants to. It simply does not know the hand that threw it.

Objections

4

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

T
Tschirnhaus 1674 · attacks premise 4

My consciousness tells me otherwise: who could deny, without contradicting their own consciousness, that I can think that I want to write, or that I do not?

Spinoza replies
Spinoza
What consciousness is he talking about, if not the stone's? In a dream we have no power to will or not to will to write, yet we believe we will it. And the mind is not always equally able to think of the same object: it depends on the state of the body.
T
Tschirnhaus 1674 · attacks the conclusion

If we were compelled by external causes, no one could acquire virtue, and all wickedness would be excusable.

Spinoza replies
Spinoza
Who said firmness of mind can only come from a free decision? And the wicked are no less to be feared nor less harmful when they are wicked by necessity.
Descartes 1644 · attacks premise 5

That our will is free is so evident that it is one of the clearest notions within us. Even while doubting everything, we felt we could refuse to believe what was not certain: nothing is surer than this experience.

Spinoza replies
Spinoza
We have no free power to suspend our judgement. Suspending judgement is only seeing that one does not perceive the thing adequately: it is a perception, not a free will.
Kant 1788 · attacks the conclusion

Calling it "freedom" to act from one's own nature while being wholly determined is the freedom of a turnspit: once wound up, it turns by itself. Without a real freedom, independent of natural causes, there is no moral responsibility left.

no reply
No reply possible: objection raised in 1788, after the author's death (1677).