Breaking the law when it makes me the agent of an injustice
Civil disobedience
If a law requires me to be the agent of injustice toward another, I must break it, openly, and accept punishment (prison).
If the law requires me to be the agent of injustice toward another, obeying makes me complicit: so I must break it.
"Breaking the law when it makes me the agent of an injustice" is an argument by Henry David Thoreau (Thoreau, 'Resistance to Civil Government' (Civil Disobedience), 1849, 1849) on the question "Must we always obey the law?" (answer: conscience first). Its claim: If a law requires me to be the agent of injustice toward another, I must break it, openly, and accept punishment (prison). According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P4). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 3 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
In 1846 Thoreau spends a night in jail for refusing to pay a tax, while his country tolerates slavery and wages war on Mexico. In his essay he explains the gesture. He does not say that laws should be ignored or that every government is bad. He says there is a precise moment when obedience becomes complicity: when the law requires me to be myself the agent of injustice. Then it must be broken, openly, and the price paid. The P1 to P4 → C form is our reconstruction.
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P4, the computer finds a case where one must do what one thinks right, where the majority does not decide that, where obeying makes one complicit, and yet where one should not disobey: for instance because reform can be won by discussion, or because disobedience would do more harm. This is the limit that the Laws of the Crito, Rawls and Arendt each, in their own way, set against it.
Objections
3Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
TThe Laws (Plato's character) 390 BC · attacks premise 1In the Crito, Socrates, unjustly condemned, refuses to escape. The Laws tell him he had two choices: to convince the city it was wrong, or to do what it orders, and that he has done neither. Obey or persuade: no third way where each decides alone what is just.
a defender replies
In the Crito, Socrates, unjustly condemned, refuses to escape. The Laws tell him he had two choices: to convince the city it was wrong, or to do what it orders, and that he has done neither. Obey or persuade: no third way where each decides alone what is just.
Hannah Arendt 1970 · attacks premise 1Arendt distinguishes the conscientious objector, who acts alone in the name of his inner voice, from the civil disobedient, who acts with others, in public, for a common cause. For her, Thoreau is a conscientious objector, not a civil disobedient. Conscience is unpolitical: it stays personal, cannot be generalised, and cares first about not taking part in wrong rather than about the world where the wrong is done. Civil disobedience is the action of an organised minority that dissents in public (our summary of her essay).
Thoreau replies
Arendt distinguishes the conscientious objector, who acts alone in the name of his inner voice, from the civil disobedient, who acts with others, in public, for a common cause. For her, Thoreau is a conscientious objector, not a civil disobedient. Conscience is unpolitical: it stays personal, cannot be generalised, and cares first about not taking part in wrong rather than about the world where the wrong is done. Civil disobedience is the action of an organised minority that dissents in public (our summary of her essay).
John Rawls 1971 · attacks premise 4Rawls admits civil disobedience in a reasonably just society, but on strict conditions: the injustice must be serious and clear, ordinary legal appeals have been tried without success, the act is public and nonviolent and done in fidelity to the legal order, accepting the sanction. It is therefore not enough that a law is unjust in someone's eyes (our summary).
Thoreau replies
Rawls admits civil disobedience in a reasonably just society, but on strict conditions: the injustice must be serious and clear, ordinary legal appeals have been tried without success, the act is public and nonviolent and done in fidelity to the legal order, accepting the sanction. It is therefore not enough that a law is unjust in someone's eyes (our summary).