QuestionsWhy is there something rather than nothing?It is not how the world is that is mystical, but that it is
Why is there something rather than nothing?The first mystery

It is not how the world is that is mystical, but that it is

The mystical in the Tractatus; "that the world is"

Ludwig Wittgenstein 1889 · 1951The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
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What it claims

The existence of the world is not a problem science can solve: it is what shows itself and before which we wonder, without being able to say it as an explanation.

Why

The world's existence is not one more fact inside the world, so no scientific explanation can answer it.

The same idea through history
Ludwig Wittgenstein1921In the Tractatus, near the end of the book, Wittgenstein separates what science can say (how the world is) from what shows itself (that it is). This second point is "the mystical".
Ludwig Wittgenstein1929In a lecture at Cambridge, Wittgenstein describes the experience behind this passage: wondering at the existence of the world, while seeing that the words to say it are misused.
Martin Heidegger1935Heidegger also treats the existence of beings as what we wonder at, in a very different language. This comparison is our own: neither cites the other in these texts.
In short

"It is not how the world is that is mystical, but that it is" is an argument by Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1921, 6.44-6.522; Lecture on Ethics, 1929, 1921) on the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" (answer: the first mystery). Its claim: The existence of the world is not a problem science can solve: it is what shows itself and before which we wonder, without being able to say it as an explanation. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P5). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 2 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1921, 6.44-6.522; Lecture on Ethics, 1929
Valid with an implicit premise

Science explains how the world is: why the planets turn, how stars are born. Wittgenstein adds that even if every scientific question were answered, "the problems of life" would not be touched. And he isolates one fact that science cannot explain, because it is not one more fact in the world: that there is a world. This, he writes, is "the mystical". He gives no answer to "why is there something rather than nothing?": he says that this question sends us back to what shows itself, which we can only contemplate in silence.

P1It is not how the world is that is the mystical, but that it is.
P2Even if all possible scientific questions were answered, the problems of our life would not be touched.
P3There is the inexpressible: it shows itself, it is the mystical.
P4The experience exists: one can wonder at the existence of the world and say "how extraordinary that anything should exist".
P5 · implicit premiseThat there is a world is not one more fact inside the world: no scientific answer, which explains one fact by other facts, can account for it.
Therefore the existence of the world is not a problem science can solve: it is what shows itself and before which we wonder, without being able to say it as an explanation.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.
Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Without the implicit premise: Without P5, one can accept P1 to P4 and hold that a physical theory will one day explain the existence of the universe: wonder would then be a stage before science, not a reminder of its limits. P5 rules this out by saying that existence is not a fact explainable by other facts.
The argument is valid with the hidden premise P5. P1 places the mystical in the existence of the world; P2 says that science does not touch the problems of life; P5 links the two: the existence of the world is not a fact like the others, so science does not explain it; P3 adds that what is left shows itself; P4 gives the experience used as a starting point. The most discussed premise is P5.
Analogy. A map of the world can show all the roads, all the cities, all the rivers. It does not say why the map exists, nor what it is to "be on the earth". The world is the whole map; that there is a map is not one more road to be found on it.

Objections

3

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

Wittgenstein himself (Tractatus 6.5) 1921 · attacks the conclusion

A few lines earlier Wittgenstein writes: "For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed. The riddle does not exist." If the question "why is there something rather than nothing?" has no sayable answer, it cannot even be formulated: so there is no mystery to solve, only wonder.

Wittgenstein replies
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein nonetheless maintains that there is the inexpressible: it shows itself, and it is the mystical.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Disagreement of interpretation: does "the riddle does not exist" deny the mystery (the question is empty) or move it (it has no sayable answer, but we wonder at it)? Readers of the Tractatus are divided.
Bertrand Russell 1922 · attacks premise 3

Russell, who introduces the book, feels "a certain sense of intellectual discomfort": Wittgenstein says a good deal about what he says cannot be spoken of. He wonders whether there might be a hierarchy of languages, each saying the structure of the previous one, and whether, in that case, the "mystical" sphere would not vanish: it would be only a fiction.

no reply
Wittgenstein did reply, but that text is not yet in our corpus.
The debate goes on (our summary) Russell himself notes Wittgenstein's defence: what he calls the mystical can be shown, although it cannot be said. He admits this defence may be adequate, while keeping his discomfort. Wittgenstein's reply is not in our corpus.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Open point: is showing without saying a tenable position, or a way around the problem? There is no widely accepted answer.
Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle 1932 · attacks the conclusion

Carnap and the Vienna Circle take from the Tractatus the idea that what is neither verifiable nor a rule of logic has no meaning, but draw the opposite consequence: the sentences of metaphysics are pseudo-statements. They express no knowledge but a feeling about life, as art does. For them, "that the world is" is therefore no mystery: it is a feeling that is badly expressed in the language of knowledge.

Wittgenstein replies
Ludwig Wittgenstein 1929 · Anticipated reply (1929)
In the Lecture on Ethics, Wittgenstein himself admits that saying "I wonder at the existence of the world" is a misuse of language. But he judges that this tendency of the human mind deserves deep respect and that he would not for his life ridicule it.
The debate goes on (our summary) The two positions overlap more than they clash: both say the sentence is ill-formed. They diverge on value: for Carnap, it is a feeling that art can express without claiming knowledge; for Wittgenstein, it is what matters most and must be kept in silence. Our summary of Carnap has not been checked against the text.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Core disagreement about the value of what cannot be said: a mere feeling (Carnap) or what matters most (Wittgenstein). Neither side has convinced the other.