Saul Kripke
If pain were identical to a brain state, it would be so necessarily; yet one can conceive one without the other.
Life
American philosopher and logician (Bay Shore 1940 - Plainview 2022), a prodigy of modal logic, professor at Princeton and then at the City University of New York. In Naming and Necessity (lectures given in 1970, published in 1972, as a book in 1980) he renewed the theory of reference and made metaphysical necessity respectable. He drew from it an argument against the identity of mind and brain.
Main works
Argues that proper names refer directly and that some necessary truths are known a posteriori.
Reads Wittgenstein as posing a sceptical paradox about what it is to follow a rule.
Gives a possible-worlds semantics for modal logic.
In his own words
« It really is a nice theory. The only defect I think it has is probably common to all philosophical theories. It's wrong. »
Positions
click a row to see the evidenceHe presents a sceptical puzzle about what it is to follow a rule; whether he endorses it or only reads Wittgenstein is debated.
Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982)
He shows that identifying pain with a brain state faces a serious problem, without himself defending dualism.
Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1980)