QuestionsDoes God exist?I am not the author of what I see: God is
Does God exist?Theism

I am not the author of what I see: God is

Berkeley's argument for God's existence; God as the cause of our sensations

George Berkeley 1685 · 1753Sensible things exist only by being perceived: there is no matter behind our ideas, only minds.
See profile
What it claims

God exists, and is known as certainly as any other mind, and even more evidently than the existence of men.

Why

I do not choose what my senses bring me, and ideas cannot cause anything: so it is the act of another mind.

The same idea through history
George Berkeley1710Principles, § 29 and 146: the ideas of sense do not depend on my will, nor on that of any man; another Spirit causes them, and the order of nature shows that this Spirit is One, eternal, wise and good.
George Berkeley1713The Three Dialogues restate the argument through Philonous: as surely as the sensible world exists, there is an infinite, omnipresent Spirit that contains and supports it.
In short

"I am not the author of what I see: God is" is an argument by George Berkeley (Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, 1710, § 26-33 and 146-147; Three Dialogues, 1713, II, 1710) on the question "Does God exist?" (answer: theism). Its claim: God exists, and is known as certainly as any other mind, and even more evidently than the existence of men. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P6). AskPhilosophy presents 4 objections, 2 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.

Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, 1710, § 26-33 and 146-147; Three Dialogues, 1713, II
Valid with an implicit premise

Open your eyes in broad daylight. You cannot decide to see or not to see, nor choose what will appear in front of you. For Berkeley, an Irish philosopher (he would become a bishop in 1734), this simple fact is enough to prove the existence of God. He thinks that what we see, touch and hear comes down to ideas in our mind. We do not make these ideas. Yet an idea is passive: it cannot produce anything. So a mind must cause them. It is neither you nor another human; and the order and regularity of the world show that this Spirit is one, wise and good. Locke started from the same observation but drew another conclusion: outside bodies. So the whole argument depends on rejecting matter, defended in another argument on this site.

P1The ideas my senses bring me do not depend on my will, nor on that of any man: in broad daylight, I can neither choose to see or not, nor choose what is offered to my sight.
P2These ideas succeed one another and change, so they have a cause. But an idea is inactive: one idea cannot produce or alter another.
P3There is no material substance, outside every mind, that could be the cause of our ideas (Berkeley takes it as established earlier in the Principles; see berkeley-immaterialisme).
P4What produces ideas without being one itself, and without being a body, is a substance that acts and thinks: a mind, which produces them by its will.
P5The ideas of sense are stronger, more orderly and more coherent than those of imagination; they follow fixed rules. This order and wisdom bear the mark of an Author who is One, eternal, wise, good and perfect.
P6 · implicit premiseIf a mind other than humans causes our ideas of sense and if the world bears the mark of wisdom and goodness, that mind is God.
Therefore God exists, and is known as certainly as any other mind, and even more evidently than the existence of men.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.
Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Without the implicit premise: Without P6, the computer finds a case where a non-human mind, for instance a finite or imperfect one, causes our ideas without being God.
The argument is valid with the hidden premise P6. P1 rules out humans as the cause. P2, P3 and P4 say the cause of inactive ideas can be neither an idea nor a body: it is a mind. P5 brings in the order that makes this mind wise and good, and P6 identifies it with God. Objections target P3 (is matter really excluded?), P4 (can a mind cause ideas?) and P5-P6 (does the order of the world prove a perfect God?).
Analogy. You read a book you did not write: the sentences follow one another with order and meaning, and you cannot change them as you read. You conclude that an author wrote it. For Berkeley, nature is that book, and we read it with our senses.

Objections

4

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

John Locke (the cause is a body) 1689 · attacks premise 3

Locke makes the same observation as Berkeley: if I turn my eyes to the sun at noon, I cannot avoid the ideas it produces in me. He draws from it the existence of outside things that cause these ideas. If matter exists, a body is another possible cause, with no need for God.

a defender replies
George Berkeley defender of the argument · 1710
Berkeley replies that bodies cannot explain how our ideas are produced: by the materialists' own admission, they do not know how a body acts on a mind. He adds that we could never know that outside bodies exist: a mind affected by the same ideas would have exactly the same reasons to believe in them.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Our summary: everything depends on the question of matter, treated in berkeley-immaterialisme. If outside bodies are allowed, the cause of our sensations no longer needs to be a mind. Realists think this hypothesis remains the simplest. The debate is still open.
David Hume (the mind in action) 1748 · attacks premise 4

We feel only the event, for instance the existence of an idea after a command of the will. But the way in which it happens, and the power that brings it about, are beyond our comprehension. Saying that a mind is an active cause therefore explains no better than saying a body is.

no reply
We have not yet found a direct reply by Berkeley in the texts.
The debate goes on (our summary) Our summary: Berkeley holds that we know the active mind by its effects, and that we are sure we act when we will (§ 27-28). Hume replies that what we feel is a sequence of events, not a power. Berkeley did not answer this exact argument.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Our summary: a deep disagreement. For Berkeley, will is the only clear model of a cause; for Hume, we understand no cause, and the mind has no privilege. The debate is open.
David Hume (cause and effect) 1748 · attacks premise 5

When we infer a cause from an effect, we must proportion one to the other: we may ascribe to the cause only the qualities exactly sufficient to produce the effect. Our world, a mixture of good and bad, does not allow us to infer an infinitely wise, good and perfect Spirit.

no reply
We have not yet found a direct reply by Berkeley in the texts.
The debate goes on (our summary) Our summary: Berkeley draws the attributes "One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect" (§ 146) from the order of the world without discussing the proportion between effect and cause. Hume writes thirty-eight years later and does not mention him in this passage.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Our summary: the minimal conclusion (a mind other than humans) is easier to defend than the maximal one (a perfect God). Defenders reply that nature as a whole suggests more.
An objection Berkeley raises himself (evil and the defects of nature) 1710 · attacks premise 5

The slow methods of nature, monsters, untimely births, blasted fruits and the miseries of human life would be so many arguments against the idea that nature is directly run by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness.

a defender replies
George Berkeley defender of the argument · 1710
Berkeley replies that pain in the world follows from the general laws of nature and the actions of finite, imperfect spirits, and that it is necessary to our well-being in our present state. Our view is too narrow to judge an isolated pain.
David Hume (Philo) 1779
Philo takes up Epicurus' old questions: they are still unanswered. If God is willing to prevent evil but not able, he is impotent; if able but not willing, he is malevolent.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Our summary: this is the problem of evil. Berkeley gives the classic answer of an overall plan; his critics reply that this does not explain the suffering of the innocent. The debate is still open.