God's will is the supreme rule of justice
Calvin's voluntarism; "he is a law to himself"
God's will is the supreme rule of justice: there is no good higher than it before which God would have to answer, and his decrees cannot be judged as one judges a man's.
Nothing is higher than God's will to judge it: so what he wills is just because he wills it.
"God's will is the supreme rule of justice" is an argument by Jean Calvin (Institutes of the Christian Religion, III, 23, 2 (Latin 1559, French 1560), 1559) on the question "What makes something right?" (answer: god's will). Its claim: God's will is the supreme rule of justice: there is no good higher than it before which God would have to answer, and his decrees cannot be judged as one judges a man's. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P2, P3). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 2 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
Calvin answers an old reproach: if God chose in advance who will be saved and who will be lost, is he not a tyrant? His answer is radical. One cannot ask why God willed this, for there is nothing higher than his will to explain or judge it. His will is the rule of justice, not its subject. But Calvin adds a precision: God is not "lawless". His will is pure of all vice, and it is the law of all laws. So he does not say that God could will anything at all.
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P2 and P3, the computer finds a case where nothing is above God's will and yet justice has a foundation other than that will: for example God's own nature, which is not a cause outside his will.
Objections
3Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics) 1686 · attacks the conclusionTo say that things are good by no standard of goodness, but by God's will alone, destroys all love of God and all his glory. Why praise him for what he has done if he would be equally praiseworthy doing the opposite? What is left of his justice and wisdom if there is only despotic power, where will takes the place of reason and, as in the tyrants' definition, whatever pleases the most powerful is just?
Calvin replies
To say that things are good by no standard of goodness, but by God's will alone, destroys all love of God and all his glory. Why praise him for what he has done if he would be equally praiseworthy doing the opposite? What is left of his justice and wisdom if there is only despotic power, where will takes the place of reason and, as in the tyrants' definition, whatever pleases the most powerful is just?
Plato (the Euthyphro dilemma) 399 BC · attacks premise 2Is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods? If God wills the good because it is good, there is a standard before his will. If it is good because God wills it, then nothing obliges God to will the good, and "God is just" teaches nothing. (See the argument "The Euthyphro dilemma".)
a defender replies
Is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods? If God wills the good because it is good, there is a standard before his will. If it is good because God wills it, then nothing obliges God to will the good, and "God is just" teaches nothing. (See the argument "The Euthyphro dilemma".)
Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals) 1785 · attacks the conclusionTo recognise the Holy One of the Gospels as holy, he must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection. Our concept of God as the supreme good comes from the idea of moral perfection that reason frames a priori. Moral judgment therefore comes before the knowledge of God's will and cannot depend on it.
no reply
To recognise the Holy One of the Gospels as holy, he must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection. Our concept of God as the supreme good comes from the idea of moral perfection that reason frames a priori. Moral judgment therefore comes before the knowledge of God's will and cannot depend on it.