The Euthyphro dilemma
Being pious and being god-loved are different things: the gods' love is not the definition of goodness.
The gods love the pious because it is pious; if their love made it so, the reasoning would go in a circle.
"The Euthyphro dilemma" is an argument by Plato (Euthyphro, 10a-11a) on the question "What makes something right?" (answer: nature or conscience). Its claim: Being pious and being god-loved are different things: the gods' love is not the definition of goodness. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the conclusion does follow from its 3 premises. AskPhilosophy presents 2 objections, 0 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
Euthyphro defines the pious as "what the gods love". Socrates asks him a question that still runs through every debate on religion and morality.
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Objections
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DDivine command theory (Ockham) 1320 · attacks premise 1One can accept the other horn: good is good because God wills it. There is no standard above the divine will.
no reply
One can accept the other horn: good is good because God wills it. There is no standard above the divine will.
Contemporary theists (Robert Adams, William Alston) 1979 · attacks premise 3The dilemma is false: goodness is neither above God nor arbitrary, it is God's very nature. God commands the good because he is essentially good.
no reply
The dilemma is false: goodness is neither above God nor arbitrary, it is God's very nature. God commands the good because he is essentially good.