QuestionsWhat is a just society?The liberty of the Ancients and that of the Moderns
What is a just society?Liberties

The liberty of the Ancients and that of the Moderns

Ancient and modern liberty

Benjamin Constant 1767 · 1830Against Kant: telling the truth is a duty only towards those who have a right to the truth.
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What it claims

Private independence (the liberty of the Moderns) must no longer be sacrificed to direct participation in power (the liberty of the Ancients): we need representative government.

Why

Today each person's share of power is tiny, so sacrificing private independence for it would cost more than it brings.

The same idea through history
Benjamin Constant1819A lecture given at the Athénée royal in Paris. Constant distinguishes two liberties that the Revolution had confused, and sees in this one of the causes of the Terror.
John Stuart Mill1859Mill takes up the idea that modern liberty is private independence, and draws a precise principle from it: society may compel an adult only to prevent harm to others.
In short

"The liberty of the Ancients and that of the Moderns" is an argument by Benjamin Constant (The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns, 1819, 1819) on the question "What is a just society?" (answer: liberties). Its claim: Private independence (the liberty of the Moderns) must no longer be sacrificed to direct participation in power (the liberty of the Ancients): we need representative government. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P4). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 3 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.

The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns, 1819
Valid with an implicit premise

What is it to be free? In 1819, fifteen years after Napoleon and twenty-five after the Terror, Benjamin Constant explains in Paris that the word has two meanings, and that they have been confused. For the Ancients (Sparta, Athens, Rome), to be free is to vote, judge, and decide together on war and peace, even if one is closely watched in private life. For the Moderns, it is to have a life of one's own: to think, work, believe and move about without accounting for it. Constant argues that the Revolution tried to impose the first liberty and crushed the second. He draws a conclusion that marked liberalism: citizens can no longer be asked to sacrifice their private independence to their share in power; representative government is the modern form of political liberty.

P1Among the Ancients, the individual is sovereign in public affairs but a slave in all his private relations: the collectivity decides everything, even his personal life.
P2In modern states, each individual's share of power has become imperceptible: states are very large (moreover slavery has gone, so no leisure for deliberating, and trade keeps people busy).
P3The Ancients, in sacrificing their independence to political rights, sacrificed less to gain more; in making the same sacrifice, we would give more to obtain less.
P4 · implicit premiseA people cannot be asked for a sacrifice that costs it more than it brings.
P5Political liberty remains indispensable, because it is the guarantee of individual liberty.
P6The representative system is the organisation by which a nation entrusts to a few people what it cannot or will not do itself.
Therefore private independence (the liberty of the Moderns) must no longer be sacrificed to direct participation in power (the liberty of the Ancients): we need representative government.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.
Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Without the implicit premise: Without P4, the computer finds a world where ancient liberty would cost more than it brings, yet where it would still be permissible to demand it (for example because it is thought good for people in spite of themselves).
Valid with P4. P1 to P3 show that the liberty of the Ancients would today cost more than it brings. To conclude that it must not be demanded, we need P4: a sacrifice that costs more than it brings cannot be required. Constant almost writes it ("it must never be asked to sacrifice it"), but does not justify it separately. P5 and P6 give the rest: giving up direct participation is not giving up political liberty, which is exercised through representatives. Constant does not claim that political liberty is useless: the end of his lecture says the opposite.
Analogy. In a small club of ten friends, everything is decided together and everyone counts. In a school of two thousand pupils, voting every rule in assembly is impossible and your voice is a drop of water. You elect delegates. Constant says the same of a country: better to delegate, and keep your time and your life for yourself.

Objections

3

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau 1762 · attacks the conclusion

Sovereignty cannot be represented, because it consists in the general will, and a will cannot be represented. A people that gives itself representatives ceases to be free: the English people is free only during the election. Rousseau also sees the difference between Ancients and Moderns, but draws the opposite conclusion: Moderns who prefer profit to liberty pay for others' liberty with their own.

Constant replies
see the argument
Constant What Constant writes (he does not quote this passage, but he criticises Rousseau in the same lecture)
Constant argues that the representative system is an organisation by which a nation entrusts to a few people what it cannot or will not do itself, as the rich hire stewards. The same differences between antiquity and ourselves make it necessary.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Both agree on the facts (the Ancients took part directly, the Moderns no longer can). The basic disagreement is about what a people loses by delegating: for Rousseau, its very liberty; for Constant, only an exercise it can no longer sustain, as long as the guarantees remain. Our summary.
I
Isaiah Berlin 1958 · attacks premise 5

Berlin takes up Constant's distinction (he sees in it the one between "negative" and "positive" liberty), but denies that they go together. Who governs me? and How far am I governed? are two distinct questions. There is no necessary connection between individual liberty and democratic government: a democracy may deprive individuals of many liberties, an authoritarian regime may leave many.

Constant replies
Constant What Constant writes (long before the objection)
Constant admits the two liberties are distinct, but argues that political liberty is the guarantee of individual liberty. Giving it up means enjoying one's private pleasures with no guarantee: where would these be found if political liberty were given up?
Where the debate stands (our summary)Berlin and Constant share the distinction, not the link: for Constant political liberty protects private liberty; for Berlin the link is contingent, and democracy is not guaranteed to protect individuals against the majority. Our summary.
Benjamin Constant (himself, at the end of his lecture) 1819 · attacks the conclusion

The danger of modern liberty is that, absorbed in the enjoyment of our private independence and our particular interests, we give up our share of political power too easily. Rulers push us there: "leave it to us, we will give you happiness". Defending only private independence would be a mistake.

Constant replies
Constant
Constant concludes that neither liberty should be given up, but that they must be combined. Institutions must also complete the moral education of citizens, without disturbing their independence.
Where the debate stands (our summary)It remains to be seen how to combine them: how far representative government suffices to involve citizens, and when participation becomes a duty. Constant leaves the question open; it is at the heart of the debate with Rousseau. Our summary.