The only freedom worth wanting
Dennett's compatibilism; "the varieties of free will worth wanting"
If determinism is true, the freedom worth wanting still exists: that freedom is compatible with determinism.
The freedom that matters is the natural ability to deliberate and act on reasons, and determinism does not remove it.
"The only freedom worth wanting" is an argument by Daniel Dennett (Elbow Room (1984); Freedom Evolves (2003), 1984) on the question "Are we free?" (answer: free without absolute free will). Its claim: If determinism is true, the freedom worth wanting still exists: that freedom is compatible with determinism. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P3). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 0 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
Dennett changes the question. Instead of asking "does free will exist, as philosophers have defined it?", he asks: which freedom do we have good reason to want? His answer: the ability to reflect, foresee what is coming, and avoid what we want to avoid. This capacity is real, it can be measured, and it has a history (it developed with evolution and culture). And it does not require the world to be undetermined. A freedom that required escaping causes, he says, would be one nobody has good reason to want.
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P3, one can imagine that the freedom of P1 exists and that another, stronger freedom is also desirable (for example truly being able to do otherwise from the same past): the premises then stay true, but the conclusion does not settle the question of free will.
Objections
3Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
Peter van Inwagen 1983 · attacks premise 2If determinism is true, our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and of events before our birth, which are not up to us. So the consequences are not up to us either. Dennett's "ability to avoid" is therefore not a real power to do otherwise: at each moment the agent could only do what he did. He can avoid the collision, but he could not fail to avoid it.
no reply
If determinism is true, our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and of events before our birth, which are not up to us. So the consequences are not up to us either. Dennett's "ability to avoid" is therefore not a real power to do otherwise: at each moment the agent could only do what he did. He can avoid the collision, but he could not fail to avoid it.
RRobert Kane 1996 · attacks premise 3The freedom that matters to us is that of being the ultimate source of our choices and of what we have become, "ultimate responsibility". For that, some of our choices, the moments when we form ourselves ("self-forming actions"), must not be entirely determined by the past: otherwise the origin of our acts lies before us. Compatibilism gives only the freedom to act according to what we were given, not the freedom to make ourselves.
no reply
The freedom that matters to us is that of being the ultimate source of our choices and of what we have become, "ultimate responsibility". For that, some of our choices, the moments when we form ourselves ("self-forming actions"), must not be entirely determined by the past: otherwise the origin of our acts lies before us. Compatibilism gives only the freedom to act according to what we were given, not the freedom to make ourselves.
Benjamin Libet and colleagues 1983 · attacks premise 2In their experiment, brain activity preceding a voluntary movement begins several hundred milliseconds before the moment when the subject reports having intended to act. The authors conclude that the cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act can begin unconsciously. Many have concluded that our conscious decision is not the cause of our acts: the capacity to deliberate in P2 would be partly an illusion.
no reply
In their experiment, brain activity preceding a voluntary movement begins several hundred milliseconds before the moment when the subject reports having intended to act. The authors conclude that the cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act can begin unconsciously. Many have concluded that our conscious decision is not the cause of our acts: the capacity to deliberate in P2 would be partly an illusion.