Without God, everything is permitted

"If God does not exist, everything is permitted" (formula drawn from Ivan Karamazov)

Fiodor Dostoïevski 1821 · 1881A novelist who stages, through his characters, the great questions of faith, freedom and evil.

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What it claims

Without God, there is no virtue in the strong sense and everything is permitted: goodness needs God in order to bind.

Why

Without God or life after death, nothing truly binds us: only inclinations and calculations remain, and anyone may lack them.

In short

"Without God, everything is permitted" is an argument by Fiodor Dostoïevski (The Brothers Karamazov, 1880: Book II ch. 6-7, Book V ch. 5, Book XI ch. 8) on the question "What makes something right?" (answer: god's will). Its claim: Without God, there is no virtue in the strong sense and everything is permitted: goodness needs God in order to bind. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P2). AskPhilosophy presents 4 objections, 2 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.

The Brothers Karamazov, 1880: Book II ch. 6-7, Book V ch. 5, Book XI ch. 8

Valid with an implicit premise

Note: it is a character in a novel who speaks, Ivan Karamazov, and the famous sentence "if God does not exist, everything is permitted" does not appear as such in the book. In Book II, ch. 6, Miüsov reports a thesis of Ivan's: if belief in immortality is destroyed, "everything would be lawful, even cannibalism", and Ivan confirms: "There is no virtue if there is no immortality." In the next chapter Rakitin sums it up with contempt: "if there's no immortality of the soul, then there's no virtue, and everything is lawful". In Book V, ch. 5, Ivan says he will not renounce the formula "all is lawful". The idea is clear. Ivan does not say that atheists are wicked. He asks what makes goodness binding. If love of neighbour is not a law of nature, and if nothing awaits us after death, only inclinations and interests remain. Someone who has neither has no reason left to obey. In the novel the thesis is tested rather than won: Smerdyakov, a servant who says he learned it from Ivan, draws a murder from it.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.

Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Without the implicit premise: Without P2, the computer finds a world without God in which love of neighbour is not a law of nature, but something else still binds (for instance reason, or everyone's well-understood interest): then not everything is permitted.

The argument is valid with the hidden premise P2. P1 says that without God no law founds love of neighbour any more; P2 says that without such a foundation nothing truly binds; P3 says that if nothing binds, everything is permitted. The objections therefore mostly target P2 (an inclination, upbringing or self-interest may be enough, say Diderot or Rakitin), or the step from "nothing binds us" to "everything is permitted" (Sartre: we remain responsible). The Euthyphro dilemma attacks the idea that God is the foundation needed.

Analogy. A game with no referee and no written rulebook: one can play it honestly, because one likes the game. But if someone cheats, no one has the right to stop them. Ivan says that without God, morality is like this game: possible as long as everyone is willing, but with no rule that imposes itself on whoever is not.

Objections

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

Rakitin (a character in The Brothers Karamazov) 1880 · attacks premise 2

Rakitin, an ironic young seminarian, says Ivan's thesis is a fraud: humanity will find in itself the strength to live for virtue without believing in immortality, out of love for freedom, equality and fraternity.

a defender replies

Smerdyakov (a character in The Brothers Karamazov) defender of the argument · 1880 · In the novel: the thesis applied

After the murder, Smerdyakov confesses to Ivan that he killed telling himself that "all things are lawful", and that he learned it from him: if there is no everlasting God, there is no virtue, and no need of it. This is not an answer by Ivan, but the novel shows what the thesis yields in someone who has neither inclination nor interest in being good.

Where the debate stands (our summary)Our summary: in the novel, Ivan does not answer Rakitin directly. The disagreement is about P2: does a love of freedom or fraternity suffice to bind someone who does not feel it? The book leaves the question open and shows instead what Smerdyakov does with the formula.

Denis Diderot (Conversation of a Philosopher with the Maréchale) 1774 · attacks the conclusion

One can be so fortunate in one's nature that one takes great pleasure in doing good, and experience teaches that, for one's happiness in this world, it is better to be honest than a rogue. These two supports make an unbeliever honest without any God obliging him.

no reply

see the argument

We have not yet found a direct reply by Dostoïevski in the texts.

The debate goes on (our summary) Our comparison: the novel does not answer Diderot. But the thesis Miüsov ascribes to Ivan targets precisely the unbeliever: for him, egoism to the point of crime would become lawful, even "the most rational". A defender of Ivan would therefore say that a good nature and a well-understood interest hold only for whoever has them.

Where the debate stands (our summary)Our summary: almost all honest non-believers agree with Diderot, and Ivan does not deny it. The disagreement is about the nature of obligation: do an inclination, an upbringing or a well-understood interest suffice, or do we need a foundation that binds even someone who does not want it? The debate is still open.

Jean-Paul Sartre (Existentialism Is a Humanism) 1946 · attacks the conclusion

Sartre takes Dostoevsky's formula as the starting point of existentialism and accepts it: if God does not exist, no good is written in advance. But he draws the opposite of an excuse from it: man is alone, without excuses, condemned to be free, and therefore responsible for all he does.

no reply

No reply possible: objection raised in 1946, after the author's death (1881).

Where the debate stands (our summary)Our summary: Sartre agrees with Ivan on the starting point (no value awaits us in a heaven), but not on the conclusion: for him, the lack of foundation does not make everything permitted, it makes us responsible for choosing for everyone. The question of P2 remains: does a free choice truly bind someone who chooses otherwise?

Plato (Euthyphro) 399 BC · attacks the conclusion

Socrates asks: is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods? If God only recognises the good, the good exists without him. If the good is good because God wills it, it seems arbitrary. Either way, God is not the foundation that is needed.

a defender replies

see the argument

Robert Adams (modified divine command theory) defender of the argument · 1979

Adams replies that "wrong" means "contrary to the commands of a loving God". God is not arbitrary: his love guides his commands, and the good itself is his nature. Morality depends on God without being a whim.

see the argument

Mark C. Murphy (Stanford Encyclopedia) 2002

Murphy states the objector's possible reply: even if God has reasons to choose his commands, it is unlikely that they wholly determine them. Some latitude for arbitrariness would remain, which Murphy nonetheless judges far less troubling.

Where the debate stands (our summary)Our summary: the Euthyphro dilemma is the oldest objection to the idea that goodness depends on God. Modern divine command theories (Adams) look for a middle way. The debate is still open.