Knowledge is dispersed: no central plan can gather it
Dispersed knowledge; spontaneous order; the economic calculation problem
A just society relies on evolved rules and institutions (market, prices, law, customs) more than on a plan drawn up by a central authority.
Useful knowledge is scattered among millions of people: no central plan can gather it, while prices make it circulate.
"Knowledge is dispersed: no central plan can gather it" is an argument by Friedrich Hayek (The Use of Knowledge in Society, 1945, 1945) on the question "What is a just society?" (answer: tradition). Its claim: A just society relies on evolved rules and institutions (market, prices, law, customs) more than on a plan drawn up by a central authority. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P5). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 1 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
In 1945, as a war in which states planned everything comes to an end, Hayek asks a simple question: who knows what should be produced, and where? Economists, he says, have treated the problem as if all the data were gathered in one head. But this knowledge exists only as scattered pieces held by millions of people. From this comes an idea of a good society: the best society leaves decisions to those who know, and its rules have grown through trial and error rather than being designed from above.
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P5, the computer finds a case where knowledge is dispersed and the market uses it well, and yet a just society must change these rules, for instance because they produce results its members judge unjust.
Objections
3Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
OOskar Lange 1937 · attacks premise 2A central board can imitate the market: it sets prices, lets public firms produce by simple rules, then corrects prices when there is shortage or surplus, by trial and error. It does not need to know local detail, only prices, as a market does.
a defender replies
A central board can imitate the market: it sets prices, lets public firms produce by simple rules, then corrects prices when there is shortage or surplus, by trial and error. It does not need to know local detail, only prices, as a market does.
JJoseph Stiglitz and Bruce Greenwald 1986 · attacks premise 3When information is imperfect and unevenly held (insurance, credit, jobs), markets are in general not efficient: prices do not carry all the useful knowledge, and well-designed public intervention can improve the result. The price is thus not the reliable messenger Hayek describes.
no reply
When information is imperfect and unevenly held (insurance, credit, jobs), markets are in general not efficient: prices do not carry all the useful knowledge, and well-designed public intervention can improve the result. The price is thus not the reliable messenger Hayek describes.
KKarl Polanyi 1944 · attacks premise 4In The Great Transformation, published the same year as Hayek's The Road to Serfdom, Polanyi argues that the market did not arise spontaneously: it was created and maintained by laws and by the state, and it destroys social bonds if left to extend to land, labour and money. Speaking of an order born without design hides the role of political power.
no reply
In The Great Transformation, published the same year as Hayek's The Road to Serfdom, Polanyi argues that the market did not arise spontaneously: it was created and maintained by laws and by the state, and it destroys social bonds if left to extend to land, labour and money. Speaking of an order born without design hides the role of political power.