Three kinds of evil, and a world that does not exist for man alone
The three kinds of evil (Maimonides)
The existence of evil does not show that God is not good: most evils come from us or from our condition as bodies, and the world was not made for us alone.
Evils come from the body, from other people and from ourselves, mostly from ourselves: the world was not made for us alone.
"Three kinds of evil, and a world that does not exist for man alone" is an argument by Moses Maimonides (Guide of the Perplexed, III, 12-13 (c. 1190), 1190) on the question "Does God exist?" (answer: theism). Its claim: The existence of evil does not show that God is not good: most evils come from us or from our condition as bodies, and the world was not made for us alone. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P6). AskPhilosophy presents 5 objections, 5 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
Many people, says Maimonides, think there is more evil than good in the world. A famous physician, al-Razi, even wrote a book against God's goodness. Maimonides, also a physician and a philosopher, answers in two steps. First he sorts evils: those that come from having a body (deformities, diseases, floods), those people inflict on each other (violence, wars) and those each person inflicts on himself through vices and endless desires. The first two kinds are rare, he says; the third is by far the largest. Then he points to the starting error: we judge the universe from a single individual, as if it had been made for us. Yet it does not exist for man alone. So evil would not prove that God is not good.
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P6, the computer finds a case where the three kinds cover all evils, where it is indeed wrong to judge from a single individual, and where God is still blameworthy because he could have created a world without these evils.
Objections
5Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
Al-Razi (reported by Maimonides) 900 · attacks premise 4According to al-Razi, a famous physician, there is more evil than good in the world: if man's well-being is compared with his pains, infirmities, fears and sorrows, human existence looks like a punishment. His book is lost; we have only what Maimonides says of it.
Maimonides replies
According to al-Razi, a famous physician, there is more evil than good in the world: if man's well-being is compared with his pains, infirmities, fears and sorrows, human existence looks like a punishment. His book is lost; we have only what Maimonides says of it.
Voltaire (Poem on the Lisbon Disaster) 1756 · attacks premise 2After the Lisbon earthquake (1755), Voltaire asks what crime the children crushed on their mothers' breasts had committed. An earthquake is an evil of the first kind, which Maimonides judges unavoidable in a world of matter: but these children are blameless, and Voltaire refuses to speak of "good" about them.
a defender replies
After the Lisbon earthquake (1755), Voltaire asks what crime the children crushed on their mothers' breasts had committed. An earthquake is an evil of the first kind, which Maimonides judges unavoidable in a world of matter: but these children are blameless, and Voltaire refuses to speak of "good" about them.
Hume (Philo, in the Dialogues) 1779 · attacks premise 3Even if pain is less frequent than pleasure, says Philo, it is infinitely more violent and durable. A small number of evils may be enough to ruin the goodness of an all-powerful God: counting how rare they are does not settle the question.
a defender replies
Even if pain is less frequent than pleasure, says Philo, it is infinitely more violent and durable. A small number of evils may be enough to ruin the goodness of an all-powerful God: counting how rare they are does not settle the question.
William Rowe (the fawn) 1979 · attacks premise 6In a forest fire, a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in agony for days. No human is to blame: it is an evil of the first kind. Rowe asks why an all-powerful God, if he exists, would not have prevented it. For Rowe, a single such case is enough to raise the question.
a defender replies
In a forest fire, a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in agony for days. No human is to blame: it is an evil of the first kind. Rowe asks why an all-powerful God, if he exists, would not have prevented it. For Rowe, a single such case is enough to raise the question.
J. L. Mackie 1955 · attacks premise 3The evils people do to each other or to themselves come from their freedom. But if a man can freely choose the good once, nothing prevents him from freely choosing it always. So God could have created free beings who always do right. If he did not, he is not both all-powerful and wholly good.
a defender replies
The evils people do to each other or to themselves come from their freedom. But if a man can freely choose the good once, nothing prevents him from freely choosing it always. So God could have created free beings who always do right. If he did not, he is not both all-powerful and wholly good.