QuestionsWhat is love?"Because it was he, because it was I"
What is love?Finding one's other half

"Because it was he, because it was I"

Montaigne and La Boétie's friendship; "because it was he, because it was I"

Michel de Montaigne 1533 · 1592'Each man calls barbarism whatever is not his own practice': our customs are not the measure of everything.
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What it claims

Perfect friendship makes of two persons a single soul: each loves the other for himself, for no reason that can be given.

Why

None of his friend's qualities explains this love: only the bond with the person himself, "because it was he".

The same idea through history
Aristotle330 BCFor Aristotle, the friend is "another self", and perfect friendship joins two good men. But he grounds this friendship in the virtue of both friends: the friend is loved for the good he is.
Aristophane385 BCAristophanes also sees in love the fusion of two beings into one, but as a myth about the origin of romantic desire.
Michel de Montaigne1580Montaigne carefully distinguishes friendship from love for a woman: the latter is more intense but an inconstant "fever", while friendship is an even, constant warmth. His argument is about perfect friendship, but the question he raises (can we say why we love?) applies to every love.
In short

""Because it was he, because it was I"" is an argument by Michel de Montaigne (Essays, I, 28 "Of Friendship" (1580), 1580) on the question "What is love?" (answer: finding one's other half). Its claim: Perfect friendship makes of two persons a single soul: each loves the other for himself, for no reason that can be given. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P4). AskPhilosophy presents 2 objections, 2 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.

Essays, I, 28 "Of Friendship" (1580)
Valid with an implicit premise

Montaigne lost his friend Étienne de La Boétie in 1563, after four years of friendship. Later he wrote what that friendship was. He is not speaking of love for a woman, which he finds more ardent but inconstant: he speaks of perfect friendship, in which two souls mingle so completely that they can no longer find the seam that joined them. And if asked why he loved his friend, he can answer only: "because it was he, because it was I". No quality of the other explains this love. The answer became famous because it defends a simple idea: we do not love a person for reasons, we love him. This text is about friendship; we place it here because the question Montaigne raises (can we say why we love?) applies to every love.

P1In perfect friendship, two souls mingle and blend into each other, in so complete a mixture that the seam which joined them can no longer be found.
P2If I am pressed to say why I loved my friend, I can only answer: because it was he, because it was I. No reason I can give accounts for this love.
P3This union goes beyond all I can say about it: an inexplicable power, which Montaigne calls fated, brought it about. We sought each other before we had met.
P4 · implicit premiseA bond that neither the other's qualities nor any other reason explains is a bond with the person himself, not with what he has.
Therefore perfect friendship makes of two persons a single soul: each loves the other for himself, for no reason that can be given.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.
Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Without the implicit premise: Without P4, the computer finds a case where the union is total, no reason is given and an inexplicable power acts, yet the other is not loved for himself: the reason could exist without being known. P4 rules this out.
The argument is valid with the hidden premise P4. P1 to P3 describe the union and the impossibility of giving its reason. But it follows that the other is loved for himself only if P4 is added: what has no reason is an attachment to the person. Without P4, love could have a reason that we cannot state, as Diotima's objection holds.
Analogy. We recognize a loved one's voice in a crowd. If asked how, we may name the timbre or the accent, but that is never what makes it him: we simply recognize him. For Montaigne, loving his friend is like that. The critics ask: behind the recognition, are there qualities we cannot name?

Objections

2

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

Aristotle 330 BC · attacks premise 2

Perfect friendship joins good men who are alike in virtue: each wishes the other well as being good, and they are good in themselves. Friendship therefore has a reason, the friend's virtue, and this is even what makes it lasting. The friend is loved for himself, but that means for his character.

Montaigne replies
see the argument
No reply possible: objection raised in -330, after the author's death (1592).
Montaigne 1580
Montaigne acknowledges such reasons exist, but denies they can explain: beyond all he can say in particular, there is an inexplicable power that made this union possible. Listing La Boétie's virtues does not answer the question "why him?".
Where the debate stands (our summary)Disputed. Aristotle and Montaigne agree that the friend is another self and is loved for himself; they differ on what "for himself" means: his character, or him, beyond any character. Montaigne writes nearly two thousand years after Aristotle and is not his direct opponent (our summary).
Diotima (reported by Socrates) 380 BC · attacks premise 4

What people love is simply and solely the good and the beautiful. If we love someone, then, it is because we see in him something good or beautiful, even when we cannot say what. "Because it was he" would hide a reason Montaigne cannot put into words: the beauty of his friend's soul.

a defender replies
see the argument
No reply possible: objection raised in -380, after the author's death (1592).
Harry Frankfurt defender of the argument · 2004
Summary: love does not first respond to the value of the beloved; it is love that creates the reasons we have to care for him. We are not led to love by reasons; we find reasons because we love. This gives a modern form to Montaigne's idea: the question "why him?" has no answer drawn from his qualities.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Disputed. For Diotima there is always a value that is loved; for Montaigne and Frankfurt, love precedes and grounds the reasons. The basic disagreement is whether love responds to a value already in the beloved or makes it appear for the lover (our summary).