The two truths: saying the ultimate with words that are not it

Nagarjuna c. 150 · c. 250All things are empty of inherent existence.

What it claims

The ultimate truth is taught only through conventions, and everything said about it remains provisional: emptiness is not one more doctrine to cling to.

Why

Without the words and conventions of ordinary life, nothing can be taught about ultimate truth.

In short

"The two truths: saying the ultimate with words that are not it" is an argument by Nagarjuna (Fundamental Verses 13, 22 and 24 · Vigrahavyāvartanī) on the question "Can we be certain of anything?" (answer: what escapes words). Its claim: The ultimate truth is taught only through conventions, and everything said about it remains provisional: emptiness is not one more doctrine to cling to. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P4). AskPhilosophy presents 2 objections, 1 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.

Fundamental Verses 13, 22 and 24 · Vigrahavyāvartanī

Valid with an implicit premise

If everything is empty of own-nature, what about truth itself? Nagarjuna answers with the two truths: a conventional truth (the ordinary world, with its causes, persons and words) and an ultimate truth (emptiness). The second is not a hidden back-world: it is reached only through the first, and what is said of it is never more than a provisional designation. Note that he does not say truth is an inexpressible mystery. He argues a great deal. He says emptiness must not become a view one clings to (13.8). We file this argument under the camp "What escapes words" for lack of a better camp: it is the closest, but imperfect, since Nagarjuna also proves things by reason.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.

Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Without the implicit premise: Without P4, the computer finds a case where the ultimate truth is taught, with conventions, without anything being said of it (by showing it or living it): the provisional words of P3 then play no role.

With P4, the conclusion follows. Without it, nothing prevents teaching the ultimate truth without saying anything, through silence or example: P3 would then not apply. P4 is not written in the text, but it is natural: 24.10 speaks of what is "taught" (deśyate), which Inada renders "expressed". Another limit: P3 comes from chapter 22, devoted to the Buddha (the Tathāgata); the verse says one should say neither "empty", nor "non-empty", nor "both", nor "neither", and that it is said only for the sake of designation. We extend it to ultimate truth in general. The question "show or say?" is precisely what brings this argument close to the camp "What escapes words".

Analogy. Scaffolding helps build a wall, but nobody lives in it. Conventional words are the scaffolding: without them one cannot climb, and one does not confuse them with the building. The text names the danger: emptiness wrongly understood ruins slow minds, like a badly seized snake (24.11).

Objections

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

A realist opponent (Vigrahavyāvartanī, verse 9) attacks premise 3

If things had no own-nature, even the name "without own-nature" would not be possible, since a name without an object does not exist. Your words "empty" and "provisional designation" therefore designate nothing.

Nāgārjuna replies

Nāgārjuna

Nagarjuna answers that he does not say the name really exists: this name too has no own-nature, hence is empty, and being empty, does not really exist.

The debate goes on (our summary) For the opponent, a name that does not really exist seems to designate nothing. Nagarjuna maintains that the use of the name remains conventional. The point is debated. (Our summary.)

Wittgenstein 1921 · attacks the conclusion

"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (Tractatus, 7). If the ultimate escapes words, then saying "it is empty", "it is the middle way" still seems to describe it: either these sentences say something true and the ultimate can be said, or they say nothing and one must be silent. Wittgenstein does grant, though, that the inexpressible "shows itself" (6.522).

no reply

No reply possible: objection raised in 1921, after the author's death (250).

The debate goes on (our summary) Nagarjuna could not answer. He does not speak of an unsayable thing: he says that what is said is a designation (22.11, 24.18). Wittgenstein himself compares his propositions to a ladder thrown away after climbing (6.54). The comparison is made by modern commentators, with no historical link. (Our summary.)