QuestionsWhat is a just society?Equality of what? Equalising what each person can do and be
What is a just society?Equality

Equality of what? Equalising what each person can do and be

The capability approach

Amartya Sen born 1933An economist and philosopher, he asks us to equalise what each person can actually do and be, more than their income.
See profile
What it claims

Equality must be supplemented by an equality of basic capabilities: what each person is actually able to do and be, not only goods or happiness.

Why

Neither goods nor happiness measure what each person can really do and be: that is what a theory of equality should target.

In short

"Equality of what? Equalising what each person can do and be" is an argument by Amartya Sen ("Equality of What?", Tanner Lecture, 1979) on the question "What is a just society?" (answer: equality). Its claim: Equality must be supplemented by an equality of basic capabilities: what each person is actually able to do and be, not only goods or happiness. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P5). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 2 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.

"Equality of What?", Tanner Lecture, 1979
Valid with an implicit premise

Almost everyone wants equality, but equality of what? Of happiness? Of income and goods? In 1979, Amartya Sen asks the question in a lecture at Stanford (published in 1980). His answer: neither works. Different people (a disabled person, a sick person, an elderly person) do not get the same life from the same income. And happiness does not fit either: a person who has resigned herself to her lot may say she is content, while she cannot move about. Sen proposes to look at what each person can actually do and be: move about, eat, be clothed, take part in the life of the community. He calls these "basic capabilities". Sen states that this is not a complete guide to morality and that the idea raises difficulties (how to count and compare these capabilities?).

P1People are very different (health, age, climate, body size, working conditions). The same amount of goods therefore does not allow them to do the same things: the conversion of goods into capabilities varies greatly from person to person.
P2An index of goods (income, wealth, rights, the social bases of self-respect) is concerned with goods, not with what those goods do to people. Since people differ, equalising goods can leave large inequalities in what each person can do.
P3Utility (happiness, desire fulfilment) is concerned with what goods do to people, but it measures their mental reaction, not what they can do. A disabled person who is content with her lot, by temperament or by resignation, would have no claim.
P4Yet if we think the disabled person should be helped, even without lower utility or a lack of goods, it is because her needs concern what she is able to do: move about, eat, be clothed, take part in social life.
P5 · implicit premiseA theory of equality must adopt the measure that accounts for these needs when neither goods nor utility can, and these two measures do not manage it together either.
Therefore equality must be supplemented by an equality of basic capabilities: what each person is actually able to do and be, not only goods or happiness.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.
Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Without the implicit premise: Without P5, the computer finds a world where goods and utility fail to account for these needs, where these needs concern what one can do, and where nevertheless there is no need to equalise capabilities (for instance because one judges that equality need not deal with these needs). Nothing says that a theory of equality must cover them.
With P1 to P5 the conclusion follows. P1 and P2 set goods aside, P3 sets utility aside, P4 says what is left. P5 is the hidden premise: it says we must choose the measure that accounts for the case, and that goods and utility together do not manage it either. Sen himself says his main thesis does not depend on this constructive part: he mainly shows that neither goods, nor utility, nor their combination suffice. The text does not say that capabilities are the only measure.
Analogy. A class goes hiking. The teacher gives everyone the same shoes and water bottle: equality of goods. But one pupil has a weak ankle: with the same shoes, he will not go as far. And if you ask the pupils about their mood, he may say he is happy to stay at the hut. Sen says: what matters is that each can actually do the hike, if he wants to. You must look at what each can do, not only at what he received or how he feels.

Objections

3

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

John Rawls 1982 · attacks premise 2

Rawls answers that primary goods do not measure well-being: they indicate what free and equal citizens need, whatever their conception of a good life. For him, it is a basis of comparison that everyone can accept. Our summary of the article (source not read).

Sen replies
see the argument
A
Amartya Sen 1990
Sen maintains that real freedom cannot be read off the means: depending on whether one is disabled, ill or healthy, the same means give very different freedoms. Our summary of the article (source not read).
Where the debate stands (our summary)Both accept that people differ. Rawls wants a public, simple measure acceptable to all; Sen wants us to look at what goods really allow. Each charges the other with a cost: vagueness of comparison for Sen, blindness to differences for Rawls.
A
Amartya Sen (a difficulty he acknowledges himself) 1979 · attacks the conclusion

Sen himself notes that the problem of indexing capabilities is serious: they have to be ranked by relative importance, and that ranking depends on culture.

a defender replies
We have not yet found a direct reply by Sen in the texts.
Martha Nussbaum defender of the argument · 2000
Nussbaum proposes a list of ten central capabilities (life, health, bodily integrity, practical reason, and so on) that a constitution should guarantee to each person at least up to a minimum threshold. Our summary of the book (source not read).
A
Amartya Sen 2004
Sen refuses to fix a definitive list: the choice of capabilities and their weights should remain open to public debate. Our summary of the article (source not read).
Where the debate stands (our summary)The disagreement is about method: a fixed list gives precise content and a guarantee but risks imposing a vision of the good life; public discussion respects diversity but leaves the measure vague.
T
Thomas Pogge 2002 · attacks the conclusion

Pogge examines whether the capability approach can be justified as a criterion of social justice. Our summary of his thesis (source not read): he judges that its defenders have not shown it, and prefers an approach based on the resources that institutions control.

no reply
We have not yet found a direct reply by Sen in the texts.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Open point: supporters of the capability approach and their critics are still debating what should be equalised and what society owes each person.
What today's voices say
Defend it
Martha NussbaumShe developed the capabilities approach with Amartya Sen. Her version adds a list of ten central capabilities.