QuestionsAre we free?To be responsible, one would have to be the cause of oneself
Are we free?No free will

To be responsible, one would have to be the cause of oneself

Galen Strawson's Basic Argument

Galen Strawson born 1952To be truly responsible one would have to be the cause of oneself: that is impossible.
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What it claims

Nobody is truly or ultimately responsible for their actions, whether determinism is true or false.

Why

Being responsible for our actions would require having chosen what we are, which would mean creating ourselves, which is impossible.

The same idea through history
Friedrich Nietzsche1886In Beyond Good and Evil (§ 21), he calls the cause of oneself (causa sui) the best self-contradiction conceived so far. Strawson quotes this passage in his paper and takes up its idea.
In short

"To be responsible, one would have to be the cause of oneself" is an argument by Galen Strawson ("The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility", Philosophical Studies, 1994) on the question "Are we free?" (answer: no free will). Its claim: Nobody is truly or ultimately responsible for their actions, whether determinism is true or false. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the conclusion does follow from its 3 premises. AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 2 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.

"The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility", Philosophical Studies, 1994
Valid

Galen Strawson (not to be confused with his father Peter Strawson) calls this argument the "Basic Argument". It does not depend on determinism: whether or not the world is determined, he says, we cannot be truly responsible for our actions. The idea is simple. What we do depends on what we are. But we did not choose, to begin with, what we are (our genes, our upbringing). To be responsible for what one does, one would have to be responsible for what one is, hence to have made oneself, which is impossible. Strawson speaks of "true" or "ultimate" responsibility: the kind that would justify, for example, the eternal reward or punishment of heaven and hell.

P1When one acts for a reason, what one does depends on how one is, mentally speaking. So to be truly responsible for what one does, one must be truly responsible for how one is, at least in certain respects.
P2Being truly responsible for what one is would require having chosen it, hence having already had principles of choice, for which one would also have to be responsible, and so on without end. One would thus have to be the cause of oneself (causa sui).
P3Nothing can be the cause of itself, at least not finite human beings: producing oneself is impossible.
Therefore nobody is truly or ultimately responsible for their actions, whether determinism is true or false.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.
Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Valid with no hidden premise: if being responsible for what one does requires being responsible for what one is, if that requires being the cause of oneself, and if that is impossible, then one is not responsible. The debate is about P1: does responsibility really require being responsible for what one is? The compatibilist says no. And about P3: can an action shape our character without a regress? Kane says yes.
Analogy. To choose a road, one must already be somewhere. To choose who one is, one must already be someone, with tastes and values that guide the choice. But who chose that someone? One goes back without ever finding a very first starting point that one chose oneself.

Objections

3

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

C
Compatibilists attacks premise 1

One is responsible for what one does as long as one is not constrained (neither kleptomaniac, nor threatened, nor hypnotised), even if what one is was entirely determined by factors outside our control. Responsibility therefore does not require being responsible for what one is.

Strawson replies
Galen Strawson 1994
It is for this reason that compatibilist responsibility fails to amount to any sort of true moral responsibility, in the natural, strong sense of the notion: one does what one does entirely because of the way one is, and one is in no way responsible for the way one is.
Compatibilists (according to Strawson)
Many compatibilists have never supposed otherwise and are happy to admit the point. They observe that this notion of true moral responsibility cannot possibly apply to anything real, and suggest the objection is therefore not worth considering.
See the rest of the debate (1)
Galen Strawson 1994
Proponents of the Basic Argument agree that this notion cannot apply to anything real. But they consider it all the same, because it is central to ordinary thought about moral responsibility and justice.
The debate goes on (our summary) The disagreement is about words as much as substance. For Strawson, "true" responsibility means ultimate responsibility, the kind that would justify eternal punishment. Compatibilists (Frankfurt, Dennett and others) answer that a more modest responsibility is enough for our lives: whether people act for reasons, according to their own values, and can be corrected. If that is the only responsibility there is, Strawson's argument does not touch it.
Harry Frankfurt and Daniel Dennett 1984 · attacks premise 3

Responsibility does not require having created oneself from nothing. For Frankfurt (1971), what matters is that our will be the one we want to have, whatever its origin. For Dennett (1984), we become responsible over time, gradually building a self out of what nature, others and our own decisions have given us. A starting point we did not choose does not prevent us from being responsible for what follows.

no reply
Strawson did reply, but that text is not yet in our corpus.
The debate goes on (our summary) Strawson answered compatibilists in general (see the first objection), not this precise text of Dennett. The disagreement concerns the meaning of "responsible": another sense, "answerable to others", does not need a causa sui.
R
Robert Kane (self-forming actions) 1989 · attacks premise 3

In an undetermined world, we can have the power to make choices for which we are ultimately responsible: choices that can only finally be explained by our own will (character, motives and efforts of will). In moments of struggle between duty and desire, our efforts are partly undetermined. We then make ourselves, and these past choices shape our present motives. Kane developed the idea in The Significance of Free Will (1996).

Strawson replies
Galen Strawson 1994
How can this indeterminism help with moral responsibility? If my efforts of will shape my character while being partly indeterministic and partly shaped by my already existing character, why am I not merely lucky?
Galen Strawson 1994 · He concludes
Nothing can be ultimately causa sui in any respect at all. Even if God can be, we can't be.
The debate goes on (our summary) Kane accepts Strawson's premise (one must form oneself to be responsible) and rejects P3: for him, "self-forming actions" are genuine beginnings. The luck objection (chance is not freedom) is old: Hume already made it. Kane answers it in his 1996 book; we have not read it. The debate has remained open.
What today's voices say
Defend it
Robert SapolskyHis core argument: "How did you become the sort of person who would have that intent at that point?" Even a conscious intent traces back to biology and environment he did not choose.