When everything seems vain: meaning found again in faith
Tolstoy's crisis; the traveller in the well; the finite and the infinite
If life has a meaning, it is found in faith, which links the finite to the infinite. "Faith is the strength of life."
Reason only compares the finite with the finite; only faith links the finite to the infinite, which meaning requires.
"When everything seems vain: meaning found again in faith" is an argument by Léon Tolstoï (A Confession, 1882 (written 1879 to 1882), 1882) on the question "Does life have a meaning?" (answer: a given meaning). Its claim: If life has a meaning, it is found in faith, which links the finite to the infinite. "Faith is the strength of life.". According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P4). AskPhilosophy presents 4 objections, 2 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
At fifty, Tolstoy is famous, rich, healthy and loved. Yet everything seems vain to him: he hides a cord so as not to hang himself and no longer dares to go shooting with his gun. He looks for an answer in the sciences and in philosophy, and finds none. Then he notices that billions of people live without despair, and that they live by faith. According to him, reason is not wrong when it says that life is meaningless: it asks the wrong question, because it only compares the finite with the finite. Faith, for its part, links the finite life to the infinite. It gives a meaning that does not come from us. Tolstoy received it; he did not invent it.
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P4, the computer finds a world where a meaning requires the infinite, where reason cannot reach it, where only faith could, but where life has precisely no meaning: faith would then be a consolation without an object.
Objections
4Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus 1942 · attacks the conclusionCamus calls "philosophical suicide" the movement by which a thought negates itself in order to save itself. He writes: "For the existentials negation is their God. To be precise, that god is maintained only through the negation of human reason." Thus the "leap" toward faith settles the absurd instead of keeping it: it is a resignation. One should rather keep, lucidly, the reason that asks for a meaning and the world that gives none.
Tolstoï replies
Camus calls "philosophical suicide" the movement by which a thought negates itself in order to save itself. He writes: "For the existentials negation is their God. To be precise, that god is maintained only through the negation of human reason." Thus the "leap" toward faith settles the absurd instead of keeping it: it is a resignation. One should rather keep, lucidly, the reason that asks for a meaning and the world that gives none.
Thomas Nagel, "The Absurd" 1971 · attacks premise 1Nagel examines those who want to give their lives meaning by linking them to something larger: society, history, or God. He answers that a role in a larger enterprise confers significance only if that enterprise is itself significant. And he adds: "any such larger purpose can be put in doubt in the same way that the aims of an individual life can be, and for the same reasons." Linking the finite to the infinite would then only move the question.
no reply
Nagel examines those who want to give their lives meaning by linking them to something larger: society, history, or God. He answers that a role in a larger enterprise confers significance only if that enterprise is itself significant. And he adds: "any such larger purpose can be put in doubt in the same way that the aims of an individual life can be, and for the same reasons." Linking the finite to the infinite would then only move the question.
Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, II, ch. 17 1844 · attacks premise 5Schopenhauer distinguishes two kinds of metaphysics. Some prove themselves and are reserved for a very small number. The others are made "for the great majority of men who are not capable of thinking", who can only believe and bow to an authority: these are the religions, which he calls "metaphysics of the people". The faith of simple people that Tolstoy admires would then be an answer fitted to those who do not think, not a knowledge the philosopher should envy.
Tolstoï replies
Schopenhauer distinguishes two kinds of metaphysics. Some prove themselves and are reserved for a very small number. The others are made "for the great majority of men who are not capable of thinking", who can only believe and bow to an authority: these are the religions, which he calls "metaphysics of the people". The faith of simple people that Tolstoy admires would then be an answer fitted to those who do not think, not a knowledge the philosopher should envy.
Susan Wolf, "The Meanings of Lives" 2007 · attacks premise 1Wolf names Tolstoy and the idea that if God does not exist "nothing matters", then judges this reasoning "ridiculous": if one activity is worthwhile and another is a waste, then one has reason to prefer the former, even if there is no God to look down on us and approve. It is therefore not necessary to link life to the infinite: it is enough that it be engaged in activities that have value.
no reply
Wolf names Tolstoy and the idea that if God does not exist "nothing matters", then judges this reasoning "ridiculous": if one activity is worthwhile and another is a waste, then one has reason to prefer the former, even if there is no God to look down on us and approve. It is therefore not necessary to link life to the infinite: it is enough that it be engaged in activities that have value.