QuestionsWhat is a just society?Chesterton's fence: understand why it is there before removing it
What is a just society?Tradition

Chesterton's fence: understand why it is there before removing it

Chesterton's fence

G. K. Chesterton 1874 · 1936Before clearing away a fence whose use you cannot see, find out why it was put there.
See profile
What it claims

Whoever does not see the use of an institution has no right to remove it. Let him go and find out why it is there: if he understands, he may then destroy it with good reason.

Why

Someone put this fence there for a reason, and until we know it, we cannot judge whether it was reasonable.

In short

"Chesterton's fence: understand why it is there before removing it" is an argument by G. K. Chesterton (The Thing, "The Drift from Domesticity" (1929), 1929) on the question "What is a just society?" (answer: tradition). Its claim: Whoever does not see the use of an institution has no right to remove it. Let him go and find out why it is there: if he understands, he may then destroy it with good reason. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P5). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 2 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.

The Thing, "The Drift from Domesticity" (1929)
Valid with an implicit premise

A reformer comes upon a fence or gate across a road. He says: "I don't see the use of this; let us clear it away." Chesterton says the wiser reformer should answer: "If you don't see the use of it, I certainly won't let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it." This is not a refusal to reform. Chesterton says that someone who knows how an institution arose and what purpose it served may very well conclude that the purpose was bad, or has become bad, or is no longer served. He only asks to understand before destroying.

P1A fence did not grow there. It was not put up by sleepwalkers, and it is highly improbable that escaped lunatics put it there. Someone had a reason for thinking it would be a good thing for somebody.
P2Until we know what the reason was, we cannot judge whether the reason was reasonable.
P3When something made by human beings like ourselves seems entirely meaningless and mysterious, it is extremely probable that we have overlooked a whole aspect of the question.
P4No one has any business to destroy an institution until he has seen it as a historical institution: if he knows how it arose and what it was meant to serve, he may say that those purposes were bad, or have become bad, or are no longer served.
P5 · implicit premiseNot seeing the use of an institution most often amounts to not knowing its reason for being.
Therefore whoever does not see the use of an institution has no right to remove it. Let him go and find out why it is there: if he understands, he may then destroy it with good reason.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.
Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Without the implicit premise: Without P5, the computer finds a case where we do not see the use of a fence although we know its reason very well (it kept sheep in, and there are no sheep any more): we can then judge, and remove it without breaking the rule.
The argument is valid with the hidden premise P5. An institution has a reason for being (P1). As long as we do not know it, we cannot judge whether it was a good one (P2). To remove with good reason, one must be able to judge (P4). And whoever does not see the use of an institution generally does not know its reason (P5). Objections mostly attack P3 and P5: the reason may be a bad one, and failing to find it does not prove that it is good.
Analogy. Before cutting a wire in a device one did not build, one looks for what it does. No one says every wire is useful, but cutting a wire at random is a risk one avoids by looking first.

Objections

3

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

Mary Wollstonecraft 1790 · attacks premise 3

Respecting a custom because it is old is revering "the rust of antiquity". Unnatural customs have been consolidated by ignorance and mistaken self-interest, and are then called the sage fruit of experience. When ivy insidiously destroys the trunk that supports it, who would not grub it up?

Chesterton replies
G. K. Chesterton 1929 · Chesterton, in the same text
Chesterton does not say one must never destroy. He says that, if one knows how an institution arose and what it was meant to serve, one may well conclude that those purposes were bad, or have become bad, or are no longer served. What he condemns is destroying while looking at the institution as a senseless monstrosity.
The debate goes on (our summary) Our summary: Chesterton could not answer Wollstonecraft, who was aiming at Burke and wrote before him. But the cited passage answers the general objection: the rule does not protect an unjust custom, it asks to understand it before condemning it. Wollstonecraft would say that the reason behind many customs (domination) is already obvious.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Our summary: partial agreement. Both camps admit that one may remove an institution whose reason one knows and which is bad. The disagreement is about frequency: how many customs have hidden reasons, and how many are only habit or interest?
John Stuart Mill 1859 · attacks premise 5

"The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement", in unceasing antagonism to the disposition to aim at something better than the customary. Applied to the fence (our application; Mill does not speak of Chesterton): requiring every reformer to understand the reason for customs first gives custom an advantage it has not earned.

a defender replies
We have not yet found a direct reply by Chesterton in the texts.
Friedrich Hayek defender of the argument · 1945
Hayek writes that our practices and institutions were built on habits and institutions that had proved successful in their own sphere and became the foundation of civilization. Our reading: what has lasted has passed a test, which the reformer does not necessarily see.
The debate goes on (our summary) Our summary: Chesterton did not answer Mill, who wrote seventy years earlier. Mill has in mind cultures where custom stifles all initiative, like the China he cites; Chesterton is not defending such societies, he asks for a method to judge each case.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Our summary: an open point. Each accepts half the other's thesis: Mill admits that customs may carry good practices, Chesterton that some must fall. They part ways on the burden of proof: on the one who keeps or on the one who changes?
Nick Bostrom and Toby Ord 2006 · attacks the conclusion

Bostrom and Ord argue that many judgements against a change come from a status quo bias: an unjustified preference for the current state of affairs. Their "reversal test": if increasing some quantity (for example human intelligence) is judged bad, ask whether decreasing it would be good. If both changes are judged bad, the onus is on us to explain why the current point happens to be the best; without an explanation, bias is suspected.

no reply
No reply possible: objection raised in 2006, after the author's death (1936).
The debate goes on (our summary) Our summary: Chesterton died seventy years before this paper. The test is aimed at quantities that can be increased or decreased, not at a fence one keeps or removes. A defender of Chesterton would also say his rule is not a blind preference for the status quo: it asks us to look for the reason, just as the test asks us to explain why the current state would be the best.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Our summary: an open point. It is debated whether Chesterton's fence is a rational rule of caution or an example of status quo bias.