Power and knowledge imply one another: truth is "of this world"
Power-knowledge; the regime of truth; genealogy (Foucault)
Scientific knowledge is partly a construction tied to power relations; the task is not to free truth from power, but to detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony in which it operates.
All knowledge presupposes power relations and truth is produced only under constraints: knowledge is not a neutral mirror.
"Power and knowledge imply one another: truth is "of this world"" is an argument by Michel Foucault (Discipline and Punish (1975); "Truth and Power" (interview, 1977), 1975) on the question "Can science explain everything?" (answer: a human construction). Its claim: Scientific knowledge is partly a construction tied to power relations; the task is not to free truth from power, but to detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony in which it operates. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P3, P4). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 1 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
Science is often imagined as a neutral gaze on the world, far from power. Michel Foucault, historian of prisons, asylums and hospitals, argues that knowledge and power are made together: to watch, classify or treat people, one produces knowledge about them, and that knowledge in turn gives ways of acting on them. Truth is therefore not outside power: each society has its "regime of truth", with its institutions, its rules and those charged with saying what is true. Foucault works mainly on the human sciences (medicine, psychiatry, criminology); whether his thesis also holds for physics is precisely what is disputed. The books are in copyright: we quote short passages from English translations, checked.
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P3 and P4, one can grant P1 and P2 for psychiatry and criminology while thinking that physics describes the world as it is, independently of the institutions that practise it. The conclusion then holds only for the human sciences.
Objections
3Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
Hilary Putnam 1975 · attacks the conclusionPutnam argues that the success of science (confirmed predictions, working technologies) would be a miracle if its theories were not at least roughly true. A science merely constructed by institutions should not succeed so well at predicting facts nobody chose.
a defender replies
Putnam argues that the success of science (confirmed predictions, working technologies) would be a miracle if its theories were not at least roughly true. A science merely constructed by institutions should not succeed so well at predicting facts nobody chose.
Jürgen Habermas 1985 · attacks premise 2Habermas accuses Foucault of contradicting himself: if all truth is an effect of power, his own critique of power has no basis for calling itself truer or more just than another. Foucault criticises without saying in the name of what, and his theory secretly presupposes norms it claims it cannot ground.
no reply
Habermas accuses Foucault of contradicting himself: if all truth is an effect of power, his own critique of power has no basis for calling itself truer or more just than another. Foucault criticises without saying in the name of what, and his theory secretly presupposes norms it claims it cannot ground.
NNancy Fraser 1981 · attacks the conclusionFraser finds Foucault's descriptions valuable, but his moral position confused: he uses "power" sometimes in a neutral sense, sometimes as something to fight. If all knowledge is tied to power, why would one form of power be worse than another? Without a criterion for telling domination from what is not, Foucault's conclusion does not say what to resist.
no reply
Fraser finds Foucault's descriptions valuable, but his moral position confused: he uses "power" sometimes in a neutral sense, sometimes as something to fight. If all knowledge is tied to power, why would one form of power be worse than another? Without a criterion for telling domination from what is not, Foucault's conclusion does not say what to resist.