One logos governs all: the divine is the unity of the world's opposites
Heraclitus' logos; "all things are one"; "God is day and night, winter and summer"
The divine is not a separate being who made the world: it is the single order of the world itself, its logos, which shows itself in all its opposites.
One wisdom governs all things, no one made the world, and the god is day and night, winter and summer: the divine is the world itself.
"One logos governs all: the divine is the unity of the world's opposites" is an argument by Heraclitus of Ephesus (Fragments B1, B30, B32, B41, B50, B67 (c. 500 BC), 500 BC) on the question "Does God exist?" (answer: pantheism). Its claim: The divine is not a separate being who made the world: it is the single order of the world itself, its logos, which shows itself in all its opposites. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P5). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 1 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
The Greek poets told of gods who made the world. Heraclitus of Ephesus, around 500 BC, says otherwise. The world, he writes, no god or man has made: it has always been a living fire, kindled and quenched in measure. This world is governed by a logos, a common reason or word, and all things are one. As for "God", he is not someone apart: "God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, surfeit and hunger." The divine would then be the unity of the world's opposites, the single wisdom that runs through it. The word "pantheism" is much later, and the meaning of the lost book is debated: we know it only through fragments quoted by other authors, in translation (Burnet 1920, Weil 1953).
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P5, one can accept P1 to P4 and imagine a wisdom that governs the world from outside: it would be present everywhere through its action without being the world, and the world would have had no creator because it is eternal. That is what those who read B108 as a "separate" wisdom suggest.
Objections
3Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
Aristotle 350 BC · attacks premise 3In the Metaphysics, Aristotle lays down that the most certain principle is that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect. He adds that it is impossible to believe the same thing to be and not to be, as some think Heraclitus says. If the god were day and night, war and peace, the same being, he would have contrary attributes at once. Aristotle himself doubts that Heraclitus really thought so: one may say a thing without believing it.
Ephesus replies
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle lays down that the most certain principle is that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect. He adds that it is impossible to believe the same thing to be and not to be, as some think Heraclitus says. If the god were day and night, war and peace, the same being, he would have contrary attributes at once. Aristotle himself doubts that Heraclitus really thought so: one may say a thing without believing it.
Thomas Aquinas 1268 · attacks the conclusionIn the Summa Theologiae Thomas rejects the idea that God is the world-soul or a principle that enters into the composition of things. God is the first efficient cause. But an efficient cause is not the matter of what it produces, and what is part of a compound does not act first: the hand does not act, but the man by his hand. So God cannot be a part of the world.
no reply
In the Summa Theologiae Thomas rejects the idea that God is the world-soul or a principle that enters into the composition of things. God is the first efficient cause. But an efficient cause is not the matter of what it produces, and what is part of a compound does not act first: the hand does not act, but the man by his hand. So God cannot be a part of the world.
HHeraclitus himself (fragment B108) 500 BC · attacks premise 5Another fragment points the other way from the pantheist reading: "of all whose discourses I have heard, there is not one who attains to understanding that wisdom is apart from all". If wisdom is "apart from all", one can infer that the divine goes beyond the world, and that P5 is concluded too fast.
no reply
Another fragment points the other way from the pantheist reading: "of all whose discourses I have heard, there is not one who attains to understanding that wisdom is apart from all". If wisdom is "apart from all", one can infer that the divine goes beyond the world, and that P5 is concluded too fast.