QuestionsIs beauty in the eye of the beholder?We argue about beauty and educate our taste: so beauty concerns the object, not only the subject
Is beauty in the eye of the beholder?Beauty is in things

We argue about beauty and educate our taste: so beauty concerns the object, not only the subject

Scruton on the objectivity of beauty; Why Beauty Matters

Roger Scruton 1944 · 2020Philosopher of aesthetics: beauty is a real value, open to argument by reasons, rooted in our nature as rational beings.
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What it claims

To say a thing is beautiful is to say something that can be right or wrong about that thing, backed by reasons: beauty is not merely a matter of personal taste.

Why

We argue about beauty and educate taste: this makes sense only if the judgement concerns the object and can be more or less sound.

In short

"We argue about beauty and educate our taste: so beauty concerns the object, not only the subject" is an argument by Roger Scruton (Beauty (2009; Beauty: A Very Short Introduction, 2011), 2009) on the question "Is beauty in the eye of the beholder?" (answer: beauty is in things). Its claim: To say a thing is beautiful is to say something that can be right or wrong about that thing, backed by reasons: beauty is not merely a matter of personal taste. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P3, P4). AskPhilosophy presents 4 objections, 0 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.

Beauty (2009; Beauty: A Very Short Introduction, 2011)
Valid with an implicit premise

"There is no accounting for taste": it is the phrase that closes the discussion. Roger Scruton notes, however, that we do not take it seriously in practice. We tell true beauty from fake (kitsch, the sentimental, the whimsical), we argue about beauty, we strive to educate our taste, and we expect our friends to see what we see. If saying "it is beautiful" expressed only a personal preference, none of this would make sense. For Scruton, the judgement of beauty turns toward the object judged, not toward the one who judges, and admits reasons. A caveat: he does not return to the Platonic theory of a Beauty in itself; he ties beauty to our nature as beings who look for meaning, and stays close to Kant in spirit, while refusing to reduce the judgement to a feeling of the subject. The book is in copyright: we quote short passages, checked.

P1The judgement of beauty focuses on the object judged, not the subject who judges.
P2We distinguish true beauty from fake (kitsch, sentimentality, whimsy); we argue about beauty and strive to educate our taste.
P3 · implicit premiseOne argues about and educates only what can be judged better or worse: if one can educate one's taste, there are reasons that make one judgement of beauty sounder than another.
P4 · implicit premiseA judgement that bears on an object and can be more or less sound reaches something real in that object, and not only the reaction of the one who judges.
Therefore to say a thing is beautiful is to say something that can be right or wrong about that thing, backed by reasons: beauty is not merely a matter of personal taste.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.
Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Without the implicit premise: Without P3 and P4, one can accept that we argue about beauty and educate our taste (P1, P2) while thinking these practices only bring sensibilities closer, as one argues to agree on a restaurant. The practices would be social and beauty subjective.
The argument is valid with the hidden premises P3 and P4. P1 and P2 describe our practices of judging; P3 concludes that there are reasons that decide between judgements; P4 says that judgements which can be decided between bear on something real in the object. The debates concern P3 (can reasons really decide, or only guide?) and P4 (can a judgement be "better" without beauty being a property of the thing, for example if good judges are those who feel most finely?).
Analogy. Saying a chess player made a good move is not saying we like it: it can be justified, contradicted, learned to see better. If chess has better and worse moves, it is because the game has reasons. Scruton says taste has them too.

Objections

4

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

Immanuel Kant 1790 · attacks premise 3

Kant grants that the judgement of beauty claims to hold for everyone, but denies that it rests on reasons in the strict sense. There can be no objective rule of taste that would determine by concepts what is beautiful: the principle of the judgement is the subject's feeling. One can therefore argue, in the sense of trying to convince, without being able to prove.

no reply
see the argument
We have not yet found a direct reply by Scruton in the texts.
The debate goes on (our summary) Kant precedes Scruton by nearly two centuries. Scruton, for his part, partly follows Kant; the difference is that Scruton holds the judgement of beauty to be a judgement about the object, backed by reasons, where Kant sees a feeling that demands agreement without being able to prove it. We have not re-read the passage in which Scruton discusses this point.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Basic disagreement: do the reasons given in aesthetics prove something about the object, or do they only invite us to look differently? Both positions have many defenders (our summary).
Voltaire 1764 · attacks the conclusion

Voltaire asks a toad what beauty is: for him it will be his female, with big round eyes and a brown skin. The beautiful changes with the species, and so with the point of view: what is beautiful to one is not to another. If beauty were a reality in things, it would not vary this way.

no reply
see the argument
We have not yet found a direct reply by Scruton in the texts.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Open point: does variation of taste between species and cultures show that beauty is relative, or only relative to a kind of being, which would leave room for a beauty proper to humans? Defenders of objectivity and their opponents are divided on it (our summary).
Pierre Bourdieu 1979 · attacks premise 2

Bourdieu argues that taste is not a gift: it comes from upbringing and social class, and it serves to set oneself apart. "Educating one's taste" then often means acquiring the taste of the dominant class, and the aesthetic judgement's claim to universality hides a social distinction.

no reply
see the argument
We have not yet found a direct reply by Scruton in the texts.
The debate goes on (our summary) We have found no direct reply from Scruton to Bourdieu. Defenders of objectivity often answer that the social origin of a taste does not prove it arbitrary: a skill acquired in one milieu, like a musician's ear, can be real (our summary).
Where the debate stands (our summary)Basic disagreement: does the social origin of taste disqualify it, or can one acquire a taste in a milieu and still judge soundly? Sociologists and philosophers of art remain divided (our summary).
A
Alexander Nehamas 2007 · attacks premise 2

Nehamas argues that the experience of beauty makes us want to share it, but does not give us the right to demand everyone's agreement: it is rather a promise of happiness, which pushes us to seek more of what attracts us. Arguing and educating one's taste is then cultivating a desire, not establishing a common truth.

no reply
We have not yet found a direct reply by Scruton in the texts.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Open point: is the agreement of others what the judgement of beauty aims at (Kant, Scruton), or only what one hopes for (Nehamas)? The disagreement is about the meaning of aesthetic discussion (our summary).