To rule is to do to others what we would not have done to us: refuse to take part rather than overthrow
The Kingdom of God Is Within You; non-resistance to evil by violence
Christianity, rightly understood, puts an end to government: no government has legitimate authority over us, and the way out is for each person to refuse to take part in state violence.
To rule is to use force, so to do to others what we would not want done to us: the only remedy is to refuse to take part.
"To rule is to do to others what we would not have done to us: refuse to take part rather than overthrow" is an argument by Léon Tolstoï (Tolstoy, The Kingdom of God Is Within You, 1893 (chs. 7 and 10), 1893) on the question "Must we always obey the law?" (answer: no master). Its claim: Christianity, rightly understood, puts an end to government: no government has legitimate authority over us, and the way out is for each person to refuse to take part in state violence. According to AskPhilosophy's logic check (Z3 solver), the argument is valid only if one grants a premise the author leaves unstated (P5). AskPhilosophy presents 3 objections, 1 of them with a documented reply, and the original text behind each premise, checked word for word.
Can a state have legitimate authority over us if it rests on coercion? Tolstoy starts from a simple rule, the golden rule of the Gospel: do not do to others what we would not have done to us. To rule is to use force, therefore to do to others what one would not want for oneself. He adds two observations: force does not protect society, which holds together in spite of it, and the state is no longer needed for people to cooperate. He does not conclude with revolution: for him, the revolutions of history only replace one power with another. His path is refusal to take part (in the army, the courts, the administration), each according to his conscience. He says himself that one cannot prove in general that the state is useless: he speaks for the one who can no longer support it.
click a premise to reject it
Without the implicit premise: Without P5, the computer finds a case where ruling is a wrong, force does not protect and the state is dispensable, and yet the state keeps legitimate authority: an authority can remain legitimate while using a questionable means if that means is the least bad.
Objections
3Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.
Thomas Hobbes 1651 · attacks premise 3Hobbes describes what happens where there is no common power: there is no place for industry, because its fruit is uncertain, and consequently no culture of the earth. Without a power to keep everyone in awe, everyone fears everyone. The cooperation Tolstoy thinks possible without the state presupposes an order that only the state guarantees.
Tolstoï replies
Hobbes describes what happens where there is no common power: there is no place for industry, because its fruit is uncertain, and consequently no culture of the earth. Without a power to keep everyone in awe, everyone fears everyone. The cooperation Tolstoy thinks possible without the state presupposes an order that only the state guarantees.
Max Weber 1919 · attacks premise 1Weber distinguishes the ethic of conviction, which judges an act by its conformity to a principle, and the ethic of responsibility, which answers for foreseeable consequences. For him the Gospel rule of not resisting evil by violence is an absolute ethic suited to a saint. As soon as one must answer for the consequences of refusing force, including for other people, politics sometimes requires using it.
no reply
Weber distinguishes the ethic of conviction, which judges an act by its conformity to a principle, and the ethic of responsibility, which answers for foreseeable consequences. For him the Gospel rule of not resisting evil by violence is an absolute ethic suited to a saint. As soon as one must answer for the consequences of refusing force, including for other people, politics sometimes requires using it.
John Rawls 1971 · attacks premise 5Rawls holds that we have a natural duty of justice: to support and comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us. And those who benefit from fair arrangements must in turn do their part. A state whose institutions are just therefore has legitimate authority, even though it uses coercion.
no reply
Rawls holds that we have a natural duty of justice: to support and comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us. And those who benefit from fair arrangements must in turn do their part. A state whose institutions are just therefore has legitimate authority, even though it uses coercion.