PhilosophersDémocrite d'Abdère

Démocrite d'Abdère

Nothing exists but atoms and the void.

AtomismVe-IVe s. av. J.-C. GreeceFounder of atomism (with Leucippus)MaterialistThinker of cheerfulness (euthymia)Known through quotations and witnesses
Diogenes Laertius IX, 45 · Seneca · fragments B 191, B 233 (in English)

Cheerful calm through moderation (euthymia)

What it claims

Happiness is the serenity of the soul, and one reaches it through moderation (few affairs, moderate pleasures) rather than through the pursuit of pleasure or agitation.

Why

Happiness is a calm state of soul that lack and excess disturb: we reach it with few affairs and moderate pleasures.

Valid with an implicit premise

For Democritus, the aim of life is euthymia: a calm and steady soul that neither fear, nor superstition, nor passions disturb. Diogenes Laertius specifies that it is not the same as pleasure. His book on the subject is lost; Seneca gives in Latin what he thinks is its first sentence. We reconstruct the argument from Diogenes Laertius, Seneca and a fragment in English. Filing: the camp "Virtue and wisdom" (living well, mastering one's judgements) is the least bad, since Democritus refuses to identify the aim with pleasure. Caution: fragment B 191 is transmitted by Stobaeus (5th c. AD), nearly nine centuries after Democritus, and we do not have its Greek.

P1The aim of life is tranquillity of the soul (euthymia), which must not be confused with pleasure: a state in which the soul, calm and steady, is disturbed by no fear, no superstition, no passion. (Diogenes Laertius, IX, 45)
P2One finds tranquillity by not taking on too many affairs, private or public, nor more than one's strength allows. (Seneca reports Democritus' precept)
P3One also finds tranquillity through moderation in pleasure and the balance of life; want and excess upset the soul. (fragment B 191, in English)
P4 · implicit premiseThe aim of life is what happiness consists in: to be happy is to be in the state one is trying to reach.
Therefore happiness is the serenity of the soul, and one reaches it through moderation (few affairs, moderate pleasures) rather than through the pursuit of pleasure or agitation.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.
Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Without the implicit premise: Without P4, the computer finds a case where the aim of life is tranquillity, where moderation leads to it, and where happiness is nonetheless something other than that aim (for instance pleasure, or virtue). The conclusion about happiness falls.
The argument is valid with P4. P1 says the aim is tranquillity; P4 adds that the aim of life is happiness; P2 and P3 show two paths to this tranquillity: few affairs, moderate pleasures. P4 is not written by Democritus: it is a bridge the Greeks readily accepted, and that we add out of charity. The most disputed point is P2, which Seneca himself narrows to superfluous affairs.
Analogy. A swimmer in rough sea tires himself fighting every wave. The one who picks a sheltered beach and a distance he can manage arrives calm. Democritus advises the sheltered beach: few projects, desires of one's own size.

Objections

2

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

Seneca (On Tranquillity of Mind, 13) 62 · attacks premise 2

Seneca quotes Democritus' sentence: whoever wants to live at peace should not do much business, private or public. But he at once limits it: it holds only for superfluous business. Necessary business, private or public, must be taken on, however much, however endless. Without this limit, the advice would become an encouragement to withdraw.

no reply
No reply possible: objection raised in 62, after the author's death (-360).
The debate goes on (our summary) Seneca writes that Democritus "of course" (scilicet) meant superfluous business: this is his reading, as a Stoic for whom public duty counts for a great deal, and he gives no proof of it. Democritus' book is lost, and we cannot check whether the limit comes from him or from Seneca.
Pascal (Pensées, "Diversion") 1670 · attacks the conclusion

Pascal holds that it is naive to tell a man to live quietly: advising him to live quietly is advising him to be in a perfectly happy condition, which he is not. Men flee rest because it puts them face to face with their misery. Taken this way, serenity through moderation is out of most people's reach, and agitation serves to flee something.

no reply
No reply possible: objection raised in 1670, after the author's death (-360).
The debate goes on (our summary) Pascal is not writing against Democritus, and we have no text of Democritus on this point. What Diogenes Laertius attributes to him is that a serene soul is disturbed by neither fear nor superstition (IX, 45): he sees in it a work on oneself, not mere rest. Whether this work is enough is what Pascal disputes.