PhilosophersDavid Hume

David Hume

Neither causation nor induction can be proved: custom guides us.

Empiricism · Modern skepticism1711 – 1776 United KingdomEmpiricistMitigated scepticCritic of religionHistorian
Of the Standard of Taste, 1757

Tastes differ, yet there is a standard of taste: the verdict of true judges

What it claims

Although beauty lies in sentiment, there is a standard of taste: the joint verdict of true judges, wherever they are to be found.

Why

Beauty lies in feeling, yet not all tastes are equal: some qualities naturally produce pleasure for true judges.

Valid with an implicit premise

Hume accepts the popular idea: beauty is not a quality of things, it is in the feeling of the one who looks. But he refuses to conclude that all tastes are equal. No one would put a poor poet on a level with Milton. His solution: there are true judges, whose feeling is delicate, practised, comparative and free of prejudice. Their joint verdict is the standard of taste. To illustrate, he tells of two kinsmen of Sancho who taste a wine: one finds a taste of leather, the other of iron. They are laughed at, until an old key tied to a leather thong is found at the bottom of the cask.

P1Beauty and deformity, like sweet and bitter, are not qualities in objects: they belong entirely to sentiment.
P2Yet not all tastes are equal: claiming that a poor poet equals Milton would be thought as extravagant as comparing a molehill to a mountain.
P3This is explained by the fact that certain qualities of objects are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings; a fine taste perceives them, a coarse taste misses them.
P4Delicacy of taste can be shown by facts: the key with the leather thong found at the bottom of the cask proves Sancho's two kinsmen right against those who laughed at them.
P5Only strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison and cleared of all prejudice, entitles a critic to the title of true judge.
P6These five qualities can be recognised independently of the verdict the judge gives on a given work: they can be established without assuming that his tastes are the right ones.
P7 · implicit premiseWhen qualified observers can be recognised independently of their verdict, their agreement deserves the name of standard, just as the true colour of an object is the one seen in daylight by the eye of a healthy man.
Therefore, although beauty lies in sentiment, there is a standard of taste: the joint verdict of true judges, wherever they are to be found.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.
Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
Without the implicit premise: Without P7, the computer finds a case where qualified judges exist, can be recognised, and agree, and yet their agreement is merely a sociological fact with no authority over others.
Without P7, the premises say that qualified judges exist and can be recognised. One must add that their agreement deserves the name of standard. Hume suggests this by comparison with the true colour of objects, seen by a healthy eye in daylight (§ 12). The difficulty of the circle plays out in P6: if the judge's qualities cannot be checked separately, the standard goes in circles.
Analogy. To know who has the best palate for wine, we do not ask each person whether he likes the wine. We look at who detects the ingredients that the key finally reveals. Hume proposes to do the same for works of art.

Objections

3

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

Immanuel Kant 1790 · attacks the conclusion

When I declare a thing beautiful, I do not expect others to agree because I have found this agreement several times before: I demand it of them. This 'ought' of agreement cannot rest on experience, so neither on the actual agreement of men nor on that of reputed judges.

no reply
see the argument
No reply possible: objection raised in 1790, after the author's death (1776).
The debate goes on (our summary) Our summary: Kant does not name Hume in these passages; the objection is our pairing. For Hume, the standard is not a mere head count of opinions: it is the verdict of qualified judges. Kant himself admits (§ 17) an empirical criterion, 'weak': the agreement of all times and peoples. The disagreement concerns what grounds the demand for agreement: the experience of competent judges (Hume), or a condition of the power of judgment itself (Kant).
Where the debate stands (our summary)Core disagreement: is the standard of taste a fact of experience (Hume) or an a priori demand of the power of judgment (Kant)? An open point: contemporary aesthetics takes up both routes.
T
The circularity charge (discussed by Jerrold Levinson) 2002 · attacks premise 5

True judges are those who appreciate what is truly beautiful, and what is truly beautiful is what true judges appreciate. The standard goes in circles: one cannot recognise the judges without already knowing the beautiful.

Hume replies
David Hume 1757 · Hume's anticipated reply (§ 25)
These are questions of fact, not of sentiment: whether a person has good sense, a delicate imagination, freedom from prejudice, can be discussed and examined like any question of fact. And all mankind will agree that such a character is valuable.
The debate goes on (our summary) Our summary: this reply avoids the circle if the five qualities can be established without knowing the beautiful. Critics judge that 'delicacy' is precisely what is in question: it is still defined as the capacity to feel well. Hume himself admits, in § 28, that some differences of taste remain unsolved.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Many commentators think the circle can be avoided by identifying judges through independent traits, but that other difficulties remain. An open point: no reading is widely accepted.
Pierre Bourdieu 1979 · attacks premise 5

Tastes are not innocent: they reflect social position and work as marks of distinction. Those held to be 'true judges', with a trained ear and eye, are often those who received an education others did not. The standard of taste risks being only the taste of a class.

no reply
see the argument
No reply possible: objection raised in 1979, after the author's death (1776).
The debate goes on (our summary) Our summary: Hume could not answer Bourdieu. He nevertheless acknowledges (§ 28) that the manners and opinions of an age and country make taste vary, but holds that, where men differ, a defect (prejudice, want of practice or of delicacy) can generally be found, so that one taste can be approved over another.
Where the debate stands (our summary)Core disagreement: does education of taste reveal real competence, or turn a social privilege into authority? An open point: both readings are defended.