PhilosophersNāgārjuna

Nāgārjuna

All things are empty of inherent existence.

Buddhist philosophyvers 150 – 250 IndiaBuddhist philosopherFounder of the Middle Way school (Madhyamaka)DialecticianLittle-known life
Fundamental Verses 1, 15 and 24 · Vigrahavyāvartanī

Nothing exists by itself: everything is empty of own-nature

What it claims

No phenomenon has an own-nature: all are empty (śūnya) of own-nature. This emptiness is the very name of dependent origination, not a nothingness.

Why

A thing with its own nature would depend on nothing, yet every phenomenon arises in dependence on something else.

Valid

Nagarjuna does not try to prove that the world is an illusion. He wants to show that nothing has an "own-nature" (svabhāva), that is, a property of its own that does not depend on anything else. This holds for objects, but also for the person: that is why we file this argument under the question "Who am I?", camp "No fixed self", for lack of a more general question about reality. We reconstruct the core of the chain here in two premises. This is a simplification: the book proceeds by successive refutations (does a thing arise from itself, from another, from both, or without cause? none of the four options holds, 1.1) and examines cause, motion, fire, the self and time one by one. And "empty" (śūnya) does not mean "non-existent".

P1A thing that had an own-nature would not be "made" and would depend on nothing else: own-nature is, by definition, unmade and independent.
P2Yet no phenomenon exists that did not arise in dependence on something else (causes, conditions, parts).
Therefore no phenomenon has an own-nature: all are empty (śūnya) of own-nature. This emptiness is the very name of dependent origination, not a nothingness.

click a premise to reject it

If you accept every premise, logic forces you to accept the conclusion. So the debate is about the premises.
Checked by a logic solver: the premises cannot all be true while the conclusion is false.
The form is valid, with no hidden premise: if having an own-nature means depending on nothing, and if everything depends on something, then nothing has an own-nature. The whole debate is therefore about the two premises. On P1: must what exists "truly" be defined as what exists by itself? Nagarjuna's opponents think so (VV 7: good things have a good own-nature); he answers that this would be a world with no cause and no possible practice. On P2: is it true of everything? He shows it phenomenon by phenomenon across his 27 chapters; that work is not summarised here. Finally, the conclusion does not say that nothing exists: he himself rejects that reading (24.7 to 24.19).
Analogy. A campfire has no "fire-nature" of its own: it is wood, air, heat, a match one evening. Remove the conditions and it goes out. Yet it truly burns: you can burn yourself on it. His commentator Candrakīrti takes the example of a chariot, which exists only in dependence on its wheels and on the name we give it (Prasannapadā, ch. 24).

Objections

4

Each objection is a conversation: click to see who replies and where the debate stands.

A
A realist opponent (Vigrahavyāvartanī, verse 1) attacks the conclusion

If everything is empty of own-nature, your own sentence "everything is empty of own-nature" is too. A statement without own-nature has no power to deny anything: it cannot deny the own-nature of things. Your thesis destroys itself.

Nāgārjuna replies
Nāgārjuna
Nagarjuna answers that if his statement is neither in the totality of causes and conditions nor apart from them, the emptiness of things is established, since they have no own-nature.
The debate goes on (our summary) The commentary on the verse (perhaps by a later hand) compares the statement to chariots, cloths and pots: all are empty of own-nature because they arise from conditions, and all nevertheless serve (carrying, covering, holding water). Likewise Nagarjuna's statement, arising from conditions, serves to establish that things lack own-nature (VV 22). It remains to be seen whether this suffices: a chariot serves, but a thesis claims to be true. (Our summary.)
T
The same opponent (Vigrahavyāvartanī, verse 4) attacks the conclusion

You cannot turn the objection back on me. The defect comes from your thesis "everything is empty" and from its very definition: so it is you, not I, who is at fault.

Nāgārjuna replies
Nāgārjuna
Nagarjuna says that if there were a thesis there, the defect would be his; but he has no thesis, so no defect is his.
The debate goes on (our summary) This is the most debated point: "I have no thesis" looks like a thesis. The commentary on the verse answers that, everything being empty and quiescent, there can be no thesis. Candrakīrti, in the 7th century, will defend this method (reducing the opponents' theses to absurdity without putting forward one's own); we have not yet collected his passages. (Our summary.)
A
A realist Buddhist opponent (Verses 24, verses 1 to 6) attacks the conclusion

If everything is empty, there is no arising or ceasing, so no four noble truths, no Buddha, no Dharma, no community, no right or wrong action, no ordinary practice at all. Your emptiness destroys everything it claims to serve: it is nihilism.

Nāgārjuna replies
Nāgārjuna
Nagarjuna answers that for whom emptiness is tenable, everything is tenable, and for whom it is not, nothing is.
The debate goes on (our summary) A few verses earlier (24.7) he says the opponent knows neither the function of emptiness nor its meaning, then defines emptiness as dependent origination itself (24.18, 24.19). Finally he turns the objection around (24.20 to 24.39): it is the opponent's position, for whom things would have a fixed own-nature, that makes arising, ceasing, the noble truths and practice impossible. (Our summary.)
A
A realist opponent (Vigrahavyāvartanī, verse 7) attacks premise 2

Those who know the state of phenomena know it: a good thing has a good own-nature, a bad thing a bad own-nature, and so on. Likewise what leads to liberation has a nature that leads to it (verse 8). So things do have an own-nature, which does not depend on anything else.

Nāgārjuna replies
Nāgārjuna
Nagarjuna answers that if the own-nature of these good phenomena arose without depending on anything, there would be no religious life (brahmacarya).
The debate goes on (our summary) The commentary on verses 54 to 56 explains why: it would mean rejecting dependent origination, hence the vision of the Dharma, hence practice; and everything conditioned would become unconditioned, for lack of a cause. The underlying disagreement remains: are fixed natures needed in order to speak of good and evil? (Our summary.)