Hilary Putnam
The same mental state can be realised by very different brains: the mind is a function, not a stuff.
Life
Hilary Putnam (1926-2016), born in Chicago, taught mostly at Harvard. In the 1960s he proposed functionalism (a mental state is defined by its role, not by its matter), later criticising it; he then defended 'internal realism' and refused a strict split between facts and values. He matters for questions about mind, truth and machines.
Main works
Collected papers on meaning, reference and mind, including 'The Meaning of "Meaning"'.
Presents internal realism: truth depends on a conceptual scheme without being arbitrary.
Argues that facts and values are entangled.
In his own words
« What 'water' refers to depends on the actual nature of the paradigms, not just on what is in our heads. »
« No sane person should believe that something is 'subjective' merely because it cannot be settled beyond controversy. »
Positions
click a row to see the evidenceHe is a fallibilist: any belief, even in science, may be revised, yet he refuses global skepticism.
Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (1981)
He proposed functionalism (the mind is what the brain does, not what it is made of), then rejected it in the late 1980s while staying non-dualist.
Putnam, Representation and Reality (1988)
He denies that facts and values are separate realms: judgments of value can be reasonable and better or worse grounded.
Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy (2002)